Publication type
Journal Article
Authors
Publication date
May 15, 2013
Summary:
We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying difference, even a small amount of intergroup contact generates large asymmetries.
Published in
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume and page numbers
Volume: 5 , p.1 -32
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.1
ISSN
19457669
Subjects
Notes
Albert Sloman Library Periodicals *restricted to Univ. Essex registered users*
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