Publication type
Journal Article
Authors
Publication date
June 1, 2008
Abstract:
We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing
model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions are made
among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the parties may
separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing,
(c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that
increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment
period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that
both wage and hours schedules are concave. Testing is based on 13 waves
of British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 2003.
Published in
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik
Volume
Volume: 228 (5-6):446-464
Subjects
Notes
Web of Knowledge alert
No doi given
not held in Res Lib - bibliographic reference only
#512169