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Journal Article

Strategic immunization and group structure

Authors

Publication date

May 2013

Summary

We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying difference, even a small amount of intergroup contact generates large asymmetries.

Published in

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Volume and page numbers

5 , 1 -32

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.1

ISSN

16

Subjects

Social Networks, Economics, and Health

Links

http://serlib0.essex.ac.uk/record=b1709031~S5

Notes

Albert Sloman Library Periodicals *restricted to Univ. Essex registered users*

#521652


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