From British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan topotential involvement in Syria and Ukraine the researchers examined the differences in attitudes between the generation who grew up with Britain involved in conflict and those of older generations. The research uncovered differences in attitudes to overseas aid, immigration, EU membership and military intervention across age groups.
Age and Foreign Policy Beliefs: Differences that Count?
by Professor Thomas J Scotto, Dr Jason Reifler, Professor Paul Whiteley and Professor Harold Clarke, was published by the Political Studies Association.
In early March, we surveyed a representative national sample of 5,125 Britons on the topic of foreign policy attitudes. People between 18 and 30 years of age, approximately 20% of Britain’s voting age population, have not yet experienced a time in their adult years when British troops were not engaged in one or both of the conflicts in Iraq or Afghanistan. People in this “post 9/11” cohort have grown into adulthood in the shadow of these bloody and protracted wars and it is interesting to ask if they have foreign policy attitudes that are significantly different from those of their elders. More specifically, we are interested in knowing whether those aged 18 to 30 differ from the group who entered the electorate soon after the end of the Cold War (between 1989 and 2001) as well as older people who experienced much of their lives in the period when global power politics focused on superpower conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Our survey evidence shows broad opposition to recent and potential future British military incursions and many other forms of international engagement. However, opposition is significantly softer among younger voters.
When asked whether the “United Kingdom did the right thing by using military force” in Afghanistan and Iraq, those who disapproved of UK involvement outnumbered those who approved by more than a two-to-one margin. Young people were actually less sour on Britain’s involvement in these conflicts than the old. The general pattern of disagreement with the wars held across age cohorts but the oldest portion of the electorate (persons over 43 years of age) were most likely to disagree with Tony Blair’s decision to go into Iraq (58%). Disagreement among those 30 and under came in at 51%, whereas 47% of those between 31 and 43 years of age disapproved of the decision to go to war in Iraq. For Afghanistan, age group differences are more apparent—59% of the oldest cohort disagreed with the British military presence in the country, 47% of 18-30 year olds felt the same way, but only 40% of those between 31 and 43 years old expressed regret over British intervention.
Turning to two conflicts that Britain may be called upon to enter in the near future—the civil war in Syria and the crisis in Ukraine—we find young people are most willing to engage. A majority (52%) of those 30 and younger supported Britain enforcing a no fly zone over Syria, whereas 50% of those between 31 and 43 years of age and 45% of those older supported this option. Although there was clear opposition (57%) across the entire sample to sending British troops into Syria to protect civilians, enthusiasm for doing so varied across age groups. Only 16% of those entering the electorate before the Berlin Wall came down supported such a move, but 29% of each of the two younger age cohorts expressed their approval. Support for a British military threat against Russia in response to that country’s aggressive tactics was low across the board—merely 5% were willing to select such an option. Again we see differences between those who came of age before the end of the Cold War; only 3% of those who joined the electorate before 1989 wanted a military response, compared to 9% among those coming of age after 2001.
Across the electorate, there are multiple signs of disengagement when it comes to Britain’s future in the European Union, accepting immigration and supporting the provision of overseas aid to those in less fortunate places around the world. In a referendum on the EU, a razor-thin plurality (40.1% to 39.6%) would vote for Britain to leave. A full 48% of the sample believes that further immigration to the UK should be halted, and only slightly over one person in ten (12%) believes the UK should spend more than the £11.3 billion it currently annually allocates to overseas aid. It is on choices in a potential EU referendum and on the issue of immigration where we see the largest age differences. Only 33% of those under 31 stated they would vote for Britain to leave the EU if a referendum was offered. The percentage who would vote to leave rises to 41% among those between 31 and 43 years old and to a clear majority (54%) among those over 43 years of age. On immigration, 53% of those over 43 and 45% of those between 31 and 43 expressed agreement with the statement that “All further immigration to the UK should be halted.” Agreement fell to 36% among the youngest (18-30 year old) group. Concerning overseas aid, only 8% of those older than 43 wanted Britain to give more, but 12% who reached the age of majority between 1989 and 2001 and 19% of those who did so after 2001 supported an increase in aid spending.
All told, currently there is widespread scepticism across all age groups concerning Britain engaging both peacefully or militarily with other countries. We can be quite confident that we are in a period where the public is expressing strong scepticism over the utility of military interventions and the efficacy of enhanced spending on overseas aid. And we can be confident that there are important differences in the level of scepticism across different age groups. The youngest segment of the electorate is more supportive of international engagement than older segments of the electorate.
Yet, there are limits about what our data can tell us about British public opinion in the long-term. As the youngest portion of the electorate grows older, it remains to be seen whether their attitudes will change or if they will constitute a distinct cohort that is relatively less sceptical of Britain engaging with the world via humanitarian or even military means. The possibility that future events may also shape attitudes about international engagement further clouds our crystal ball.
The full post is available to read at Political Insights published by the Political Studies Association..
Jason Reifler is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics (University of Exeter). Harold D. Clarke is Ashbel Smith Professor in the School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences (University of Texas at Dallas). Thomas J. Scotto and Paul Whiteley are Professors in the Department of Government (University of Essex).
Data collection for the foreign policy attitudes project was supported by ESRC Grants RES-061-25-0405 and ES/L011867/1 awarded to members of the team. Professor Scotto also thanks the ESRC Research Centre on MicroSocial Change at the University of Essex for providing him with the time necessary to analyse these data.