The Political Economy of Corruption in the BureaucracyISER Internal Seminars

We ask whether and how politicians’ re-election incentives affect corruption among public officers. In order to identify the effect of re-election incentives, we make use of detailed data on term limits across local government heads in Indonesia and novel data on corruption among different types of public officers. Preliminary results suggest that re-elections incentives affect corruption within the bureaucracy, and that the effect differs depending on the type of bureaucrat one considers. The results are consistent with politicians being able to monitor their public officers, and re-election incentives constituting monitoring incentives for the politician.

Presented by:

Michele Valsecchi (University of Gothenburg)

Date & time:

April 29, 2015 11:00 am - April 29, 2015 12:00 pm


Large Seminar Room (2N2.4.16)

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