Economic theories of the household predict that increases in female human capital lead to increases in female labor force participation and,
symmetrically, to decreases in the female time devoted to household production. However, both at the longitudinal and cross-sectional level we
observe that, despite the decline in the wage gender gap, specialization in home production continues to be high with women providing most of household
produced goods and services. We develop a simple model that recognizes the imperfect commitment associated to the negotiation of household production
activities, which might lead to inefficient outcomes. Imperfect commitment problems are hypothesized to be stronger the higher the woman’s wage and
also the less credible threats available. We test the model using the 2002-2003 Spanish Time Use Survey, a time diary survey with information on
the time devoted to household production activities by both partners. Empirical findings support the proposed model of imperfect commitment in the
allocation of household time. Although a woman’s home time decreases as her wage goes up, this effect is less pronounced as her wage is higher.
Furthermore, those household activities where commitment failures are stronger (such as those involving care) are less elastic to an increase in
the female wage.
Presented by:
Almudena Sevilla-Sanz, ISER
Date & time:
January 18, 2006 1:00 pm - January 18, 2006 12:00 am
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