How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented around the world: deferred acceptance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC). These two mechanisms are widely considered excellent choices owing to their outstanding stability and incentive properties. We show theoretically and empirically that both mechanisms perform poorly with regards to two key desiderata such as efficiency and equality. In contrast, the rank-minimizing mechanism is significantly more efficient and egalitarian. It is also Pareto optimal for the students, unlike DA, and generates less justified envy than TTC.
Presented by:
Dr Josue Ortega (Queen's University Belfast)
Date & time:
May 11, 2022 11:30 am - May 11, 2022 12:30 pm
Venue:
Hybrid event: room 5B.24 & remotely via Zoom - contact the series organisers (at iserseminars@essex.ac.uk) if you do not have the link.
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