This paper presents evidence on the consequences of the 1912 introduction of “quasi-universal” male suffrage in Italy. The reform increased the electorate from slightly less than three million to 8,650,000 and left the electoral rules and the district boundaries unchanged. This allows us to exploit the heterogeneity in enfranchisement rates across electoral districts to identify the causal effects of franchise extension on a number of political outcomes. The reform caused an increase in the vote share of social reformers, revolutionaries and anti-constitutional candidates (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals), together referred to as the Estrema. One standard deviation in the share of newly enfranchised voters over the total number of registered 1913 voters caused an increase of around 2% in votes for Estrema candidates. At the same time it caused a modest decrease in the net parliamentary seat gains of these same candidates, while not reducing the chances of election for MPs of aristocratic and elite background. Other outcomes (Extrema candidacy decisions and Herfindel-Hirshman index of electoral competition) were also unchanged. These findings show that de jure political equalization did not cause major changes to political representation, although the voting choices of the formerly and newly enfranchised citizens differed on average. This apparent puzzle was in reality the consequence of the heterogeneity of the effect across a number of both social and political dimensions.
Presented by:
Valentino Larcinese (London School of Economics)
Date & time:
June 13, 2011 3:00 pm
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