

Preferences and Biases in Educational Choices and Labor Market Expectations: Shrinking the Black Box of Gender

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Abstract

Standard observed characteristics explain only part of the differences between men and women in education choices and labor market trajectories. Using an experiment to derive students' levels of overconfidence, and preferences for competitiveness and risk, this paper investigates whether these behavioral biases and preferences explain gender differences in college major choices and expected future earnings. In a sample of high-ability undergraduates, we find that competitiveness and overconfidence, but not risk aversion, are i) systematically related with expectations about future earnings, ii) explain 18% of the gender gap in expectations, and iii) are poorly proxied by other observed variables.

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1 Introduction

While considerable progress has been made to explain gender differences occupations and labor market trajectories, residual differences remain unaccounted for by standard variables, such as experience, amount and quality of education, family background, as well as customary demographic characteristics (Blau and Kahn, 2000, 2012; Jarrell and Stanley, 2004; Black et al., 2008; Hegewisch et al., 2013). What accounts for the remaining differences? A recent and growing literature points at expectations as an important predictor of educational choices and attainment.¹ Not only are students more likely to self-select into fields in which they expect relatively higher earnings (Arcidiacono et al., 2013; Wiswall and Zafar, 2013; Zafar, 2013), but expectations can easily become self-fulfilling. For example, students with low expectations will have a smaller incentive to perform well academically (Jacob and Wilder, 2011; Beaman et al., 2012; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012), or subsequently, they will be more willing to accept a low-paying job offer and less likely to negotiate for higher salary because it is in line with their beliefs. Consequently, studying gender differences in expected earnings can take us a long way in explaining the observed gender differences in career choices and success. In fact, given that realized earnings and other labor market outcomes can be affected by a number of unanticipated events (and may suffer from the problem of reverse causality), we argue that investigating why young men and women form different expectations about future earnings is potentially *more* important than realized earnings for the purpose of understanding the role of gender in education and career choices.

In this paper, we evaluate whether well-documented differences between men and women showing that men are more competitive (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011), tend to be more overconfident (Bertrand, 2011), and are more

¹Evidence from other domains—retirement savings, investment, health—also shows that expectations tend to be good predictors of choices, above and beyond standard determinants (Wolpin and van der Klaauw, 2008; Armantier et al., 2012; de Paula et al., 2013). The analysis of earnings expectations follows a larger literature that collects and uses subjective expectations data to understand decision-making under uncertainty (for a survey, see Manski, 2004).

willing to take risks (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), which we measure in a laboratory experiment, help explain gender differences in expectations about future earnings and educational choices in a sample of undergraduate students from New York University.

In our survey of high-ability college students, there is a large gender gap in expected future earnings that increases with age: compared to men, on average, women expect to earn 31% less at age 30 and 39% less at age 45. The observed gender wage gap is the result of gender differences in expected earnings within each major/occupation as well as gender differences in major/occupational choices. More specifically, in our sample, males are 82% more likely to major in business and women are 62% more likely to major in the humanities, which mirrors observed gender differences in major choice in nationally representative data of the US (Gemici and Wiswall, 2013). To isolate the effect of major choice on earnings expectations, we collect data on students' expected earnings in *all* majors (as defined by aggregated major categories) and not simply their *chosen* major. On average across all majors, women expect to earn 19% less than men at age 30 and 23% less at age 45.² Hence, even though college major choice explains an important part of the difference in the earnings expectations of men and women (as in Brown and Corcoran, 1997; Weinberger, 1998; Arcidiacono, 2004), an equally if not more important part is due to differences in expected earnings within majors.

We also find substantial gender differences in each of the experimentally-derived measures. We calculate a relative risk aversion coefficient for each student using a series of lotteries and find that the average coefficient for men is 56% lower than that for women, indicating that men are less risk

²While there is no direct counterpart to the expected earnings data in realized earnings—the survey data on expectations is about future, unrealized earnings—, and our sample of expectations is from a high ability population at an elite private university, it is worth noting that expected earnings mirror gender gaps in realized earnings for all US college graduates, with women's average earnings being 17% lower than those of men at age 30 and 36% lower at age 45 (controlling for differences in major composition between genders). When we ask our sample a separate set of questions about their perceptions of average earnings in the US population, we find that the students' beliefs about average earnings are substantially lower than their beliefs about their own earnings, and their beliefs about the general population, on average, closely match the true average population earnings.

averse. We also find that men are more than twice as likely as women to overestimate their true ability level, which we use to construct a measure of overconfidence. Finally, we find that men are twice as likely as women to pick a compensation scheme where rewards are allocated through competition with others (a tournament) rather than through non-competitive means. Moreover, the difference in competitiveness between men and women remains when we construct a competitiveness measure that controls for perceptions of relative abilities and risk preferences.

In analyzing the combined experiment and survey data, we find that the competitiveness and overconfidence measures, but not the risk aversion measure, are significantly related to the student's expectations about future major-specific earnings, with earnings expectations increasing in the level of competitiveness and overconfidence. The experimentally-derived attributes alone explain 17% and 19% of the gender gap in earnings expectations for age 30 and age 45, respectively. Note that this analysis is conducted within major and hence the effect of these experimentally-derived attributes on earnings is not confounded by gender differences in major composition. Furthermore, these differences in earnings expectations are specific to the individual's beliefs about his or her own future earnings in a given major, as we find no statistically significant relationship between the experimental measures and the students' perceptions about the *average* earnings in the population. Two other findings underscore the importance of the relationship between the competitiveness and overconfidence measures and earnings expectations. First, the experimental measures explain as much of the gender gap in earnings expectations as a rich set of control variables, including the student's SAT scores, race, and family background. Second, the experimental measures are not well proxied by the control variables measuring ability and family background, as we find that they are not significantly related to the control variables. Thus, our findings highlight that a small number of individual attributes can explain a substantial portion of the gender gap in earnings expectations, a portion that would otherwise be unaccounted for by even a relatively rich set of control variables.

The relationship between overconfidence and competitiveness and earn-

ings expectations provides important insight into the mechanisms underlying gender differences in the labor market. Our results are consistent with either overconfident (underconfident) students sorting themselves into (out of) higher-paying occupations within a major category, and/or overconfident (underconfident) students expecting to be more (less) successful in higher-paying occupations. Disproportionately overconfident men may pursue different occupations on the extensive margin and more aggressively negotiate for salary on the intensive margin than women. Our results also suggest that the gender gap in earnings expectations are partly driven by overly competitive individuals, who are disproportionately men, who presumably seek occupations with tournament-based pay, whilst individuals who are averse to competition, who are disproportionately women, shy away from such higher-paying jobs.³ These findings, based on a sample of high ability students attending an elite university (i.e., precisely the kind of students who have a realistic chance of making it to the higher echelons of their professions), provide a possible explanation for the glass ceiling phenomenon (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Albrecht et al., 2003; Bertrand et al., 2010), whereby higher earning and higher prestige positions require aggressive negotiation and compensation is based on relative performance.

In contrast to the results on future earnings expectations, we find that our experimental measures of competitiveness and overconfidence are not systematically related with major choice, as defined in our survey by three aggregated major categories. Consistent with risk preferences affecting schooling decisions (Nielsen and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006; Belzil and Leonardi, 2007), we do find that risk averse students are less likely to select into majors with greater earnings uncertainty, but the result is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Using the students' perceptions of the characteristics of each major

³There are various reasons why occupations with tournament-based pay might have higher expected earnings. For example, if performance pay is used in markets with adverse selection to differentiate employees according to their ability, it can lead to overincentivization of the most talented workers (Moen and Rosén, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2013). Alternatively, if most people find competition to be inherently distasteful (e.g., in our sample only 14% of the students are classified as overly competitive), then there can be a compensating wage differential for competitive jobs.

(e.g., prevalence of bonus pay, earnings uncertainty, and other job attributes), we find that the lack of a relationship between the experimental measures and major choice is not because students think that all majors are equally competitive or equally risky.

Our finding of a lack of relationship between competitiveness and perceived major choice contrasts with the findings in a concurrent study of Buser et al. (2013), which correlates the same type of competitiveness measure to high school tract choice among Dutch students. They find that controlling for ability, confidence, and risk attitudes, laboratory measures of competitiveness explain about 15% of the gender gap in the “prestige” of high school tract choice, with boys more likely to choose the prestigious science and health tracts over the less prestigious humanities tracts. While our sample shares the general gender gap in human capital investments, with women more likely to choose humanities fields over science and business fields, we do not find a similar relationship between competitiveness and major choice. Our study is not strictly comparable given that our sample is different (high ability American college students versus Dutch high school students), and our measure of education is at the university level. In addition, the two settings (US and Europe) may differ in how prestigiousness relates with fields of study (for the European context, they argue that prestigiousness of educational profiles perfectly correlates with their math and science intensity), and how the fields of study map into occupations. Our data are similar to theirs (though our experimental measures are derived somewhat differently), and we additionally have data on earnings expectations. Therefore, our study complements their work by showing that competitiveness and confidence measures strongly relate to earnings expectations, and that these measures can even explain gender differences *within* careers.

2 Study design

Experiment The main goal of the experiment is to obtain individual-specific measures of competitiveness, overconfidence, and risk preferences. Our design is an adaptation of the setup implemented in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). More details on procedures are presented in the Appendix.

In the experiment, students are asked to perform a task that consists of computing sums of four two-digit numbers for four minutes. As Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we use an addition task because it requires both effort and skill, and prior research suggests there are no gender differences in ability on easy math tasks (Hyde et al., 1990). Students perform the task in three different rounds: (i) a round with a *Tournament* compensation scheme, (ii) a round with a *Piece-rate* compensation scheme, and (iii) a round where they have a *Choice* between the tournament and piece-rate compensation schemes. Students were also asked to estimate their rank in the Tournament round.

Our design differs from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) in two ways. First, instead of asking participants for their expected rank, we elicit their subjective beliefs about their entire rank distribution. Hence, in our analysis, we do not need to assume that participants report the same statistic of their subjective distribution and that there are no gender differences in the statistic they choose to report (see Manski, 2004). This allows us to investigate overconfidence (i.e., biases in beliefs) at the individual level and incorporate potentially biased beliefs into the construction of the measure of competitiveness, as we show in the next section. Second, we use a slightly different order of compensation schemes. In their design, participants first perform under piece-rate, then tournament, and then choice whereas we had them first perform under tournament, then choice, and then piece-rate.

Lastly, since risk attitudes may be an important determinant of labor market outcomes and women are usually found to be more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), we measure the students' willingness to take risks. Specifically, at the end of the experiment, we give students an incentivized task similar to that in Dohmen et al. (2010). Exact procedures are detailed in the Appendix.

Survey In the survey, we collect basic demographic data from the students, including their choice of college major (or intended major) and a number of beliefs about various majors, including their beliefs about future earnings that they would earn if they were to complete different majors. In order to keep the survey manageable, we aggregated the various college majors into five

categories: 1) Business and economics, 2) Engineering and computer science, 3) Humanities and other social sciences, 4) Natural sciences and math, and 5) Never graduate/drop out.⁴ Conditional on graduating in each of these major categories, students are asked for their own expected earnings at different points in time (at ages 30 and 45), and the probability that they will earn more than \$35k and \$85k at age 30. For each of the potential majors, we also ask a series of questions about the perceived difficulty of each major and the students relative ability to complete the major.

Sample characteristics The study was administered to New York University (NYU) undergraduate students and further details are presented in the Appendix. A total of 257 students participated in the study. However, we decided to drop the 11 students (6 males and 5 females) who major in Engineering and Computer Science because it would be problematic to make robust claims about gender differences in these majors based on so few observations.⁵ This leaves us with a sample of 246 students.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of key demographic variables. The first column reports the data for the whole sample and the next two columns report the statistics by gender (34% of our sample is male and 66% is female). The last column reports p -values from tests of equality of distributions between males and females, based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the ordinal variables and χ^2 tests for the categorical variables (all tests are two-sided). Judging by their SAT scores and parental characteristics, our sample represents a high ability group of college students from a high socioeconomic group. There are no statistically significant demographics differences between male and female students except for their SAT math score, where males score significantly higher than females ($p = 0.004$).

⁴We provided students with a link where they could see how each college major maps into our aggregate categories. Before the official survey began, students first answer a few simple practice questions in order to familiarize themselves with the format of the questions.

⁵It is not unusual to recruit few students from Engineering and Computer Science since it is a very small major at NYU. The proportion of engineering students in our sample is in line with the distribution of majors among NYU graduates in 2011 according to the *Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System*.

Table 1: Sample characteristics

Note: For the continuous outcomes, means are reported in the first cell and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The rightmost column reports p -values from tests of equality of distributions between males and females, based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for ordinal variables and χ^2 tests for categorical variables.

		All ($n = 246$)	Males ($n = 83$)	Females ($n = 163$)	p-value
Age		21.40 (1.22)	21.43 (1.23)	21.38 (1.21)	0.733
Race:	White	29.67%	34.94%	26.99%	0.320
	Asian	49.19%	48.19%	49.69%	
	Other	21.14%	16.87%	23.31%	
Parents' income		139.64 (123.39)	144.58 (127.80)	137.13 (121.41)	0.702
Mother with B.A.		67.89%	73.49%	65.03%	0.179
Father with B.A.		69.92%	71.08%	69.33%	0.776
SAT math score		696.42 (80.77)	718.31 (69.40)	684.44 (84.11)	0.004
SAT verbal score		676.83 (75.65)	683.12 (67.85)	673.47 (79.54)	0.588
GPA		3.46 (0.32)	3.46 (0.33)	3.47 (0.31)	0.835
School year:	1 st	11.38%	10.84%	11.66%	0.723
	2 nd	10.16%	10.84%	9.82%	
	3 rd	36.99%	32.53%	39.26%	
	$\geq 4^{\text{th}}$	41.46%	45.78%	39.26%	

3 Experimental measures

In this section we provide a brief overview of the experimental data and then describe how we use them to obtain individual-specific measures of risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness. Panel A in Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables from the experiment (additional descriptive statistics are available in the Appendix). The first column reports statistics for all students, the next two columns report the statistics by gender, and the last column reports p -values from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the distributions of males and females.

We see that the mean number of sums answered correctly is higher for males than for females (the difference is statistically significant in the Tournament and Piece-rate rounds but not in the Choice round). Hence, unlike in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), in our sample the average man performs slightly better than the average woman, which is in line with men also having

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the experiment

Note: For the continuous outcomes, means are reported in the first cell and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The rightmost column reports p -values from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the distributions of males and females.

	All	Males	Females	p -value
PANEL A: EXPERIMENTAL OUTCOMES				
Earnings	39.66 (10.78)	40.83 (12.45)	39.07 (9.80)	0.611
Correct answers: Tournament	11.85 (3.80)	12.83 (4.75)	11.34 (3.12)	0.032
Piece-rate	12.88 (4.32)	14.00 (5.01)	12.31 (3.80)	0.022
Choice	12.59 (4.08)	13.42 (5.06)	12.17 (3.43)	0.196
Subjective prob. of 1 st rank	0.34 (0.26)	0.45 (0.32)	0.28 (0.21)	0.001
% choosing Tournament	35.77%	54.22%	26.38%	0.001
Number of lottery choices	6.76 (2.07)	7.23 (1.80)	6.52 (2.16)	0.004
PANEL B: INDIVIDUAL-SPECIFIC MEASURES				
CRRA coefficient	0.62 (0.99)	0.41 (0.68)	0.73 (1.11)	0.008
Overconfidence	0.09 (0.27)	0.14 (0.27)	0.06 (0.26)	0.041
Competitiveness	-0.15 (0.63)	-0.04 (0.62)	-0.21 (0.63)	0.047
Competitiveness rank	-7.78 (22.19)	-3.14 (18.39)	-10.32 (23.69)	0.030
Residual competitiveness	0.00 (0.41)	0.08 (0.45)	-0.05 (0.39)	0.022

higher average SAT math scores. However, judging by the size of the standard deviations, performance varies considerably within each gender. Consistent with the difference in performance, we see that the elicited belief of being ranked first in their group is significantly higher for men than for women (45% vs. 28%, $p < 0.001$). Moreover, we find a clear gender difference in the tendency to enter competitive environments: 54% of the male students choose to be compensated according the tournament versus only 26% of females students ($p < 0.001$).⁶ Finally, we also find that men choose the lottery over the certain payoff significantly more often than women in the risk elicitation task.

Risk preferences For our measure of risk preferences, we assume that the students' utility functions take the standard CRRA form and we use each

⁶This gender difference has been reported in many experiments with a similar design (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Cason et al., 2010; Healy and Pate, 2011; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Niederle et al., 2012) as well as in experiments that vary the design in important ways (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Andersen et al., 2012; Booth and Nolen, 2012; Gupta et al., 2013).

student's choices in the risk elicitation task to calculate their coefficient of relative risk aversion. In other words, each choice by student i in the risk elicitation task consists of choosing between a certain payoff π_c , which gives utility $U_i(\pi_c) = (\pi_c^{1-\rho_i})/(1 - \rho_i)$, and a lottery L that pays $\pi_h = \$5$ with 0.50 probability and $\pi_l = \$1$ otherwise, yielding expected utility $EU_i(L) = \frac{1}{2}(\pi_h^{1-\rho_i})/(1 - \rho_i) + \frac{1}{2}(\pi_l^{1-\rho_i})/(1 - \rho_i)$, where ρ_i is i 's coefficient of relative risk aversion. By looking at the value of π_c in the risk elicitation task at which student i switches from choosing the lottery to choosing the certain payoff, we obtain a range for the value of that student's relative risk aversion coefficient ρ_i . For simplicity, we take the midpoint of this interval as the value of ρ_i .⁷ Note that, 17 ($\approx 7\%$) of our students had choice patterns that are inconsistent with expected utility maximization.⁸ Given that our analysis calls for an accurate measure of risk preferences, we decided that the most prudent step is to drop these students from all subsequent data analysis. However, the results in the paper are robust to including these students and using the first instance of them switching to the certain payoff as their switching point.

Panel B in Table 2 provides the mean and standard deviation for the values of ρ_i . We can see that the mean coefficient of relative risk aversion is positive, indicating that students are risk averse on average. Moreover, consistent with the literature on risk preferences using monetary incentives (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), females exhibit significantly higher values of ρ_i indicating that they are more risk averse than men (0.73 vs. 0.41, Wilcoxon rank-sum test $p = 0.008$). Taking a closer look at the distribution of risk preferences reveals that 40% of females and 55% of males exhibit choices that are consistent with risk neutral preferences, 49% of females and 30% of males exhibit choices that are consistent with risk averse preferences, and 11% of females and 15% of males exhibit choices that are consistent with risk loving preferences.

⁷We set $\rho_i = -1$ for students who always chose the lottery and $\rho_i = 5$ for students who always chose the certain payoff. Our analysis is not sensitive to these parameterizations.

⁸It is commonly found in the literature that a small fraction of participants, typically around 10%, either switch multiple times or switch once from the certain payoff to the lottery (see Holt and Laury, 2002).

Overconfidence As has been done by others, we define overconfidence as overestimating one’s own abilities relative to others (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2008). To measure it, we compare each student’s subjective probability of being ranked first in the Tournament round with their *true* probability of ranking first. To compute each student’s true probability of ranking first, we use the distribution of performance by all students in the Tournament round to draw 100,000 comparison groups for each student (draws within a comparison group are done without replacement). We then simply calculate the fraction of times each student is ranked first. Obtained this way, this fraction approximates the true probability of ranking first.⁹ Mirroring the gender difference in number of correct sums, men have a significantly higher true probability of being ranked first than women (33% vs. 21%, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, $p = 0.032$).

As our measure of overconfidence, we take the students’ subjective probability of being ranked first and subtract their true probability of attaining that rank. Positive (negative) values of this variable therefore indicate overconfidence (underconfidence). Panel B in Table 2 provides the mean and standard deviation of this variable. On average, both males and females overestimate their relative performance.¹⁰ However, consistent with the literature on gender differences in overconfidence (e.g., Beyer, 1990; Lundeberg et al., 1994; Bengtsson et al., 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Reuben et al., 2012), the mean level of overconfidence is larger for men than for women (14 percentage points vs. 6 percentage points, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, $p = 0.047$).

Competitiveness Following Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we obtain measures of competitiveness using the students’ decision to enter the tournament in the Choice round. However, in addition to individual differences in com-

⁹We use the probability of ranking first in the Tournament round because it is the most relevant for their choice between the tournament and piece-rate compensation schemes, which we use to construct our measure of competitiveness. Alternatively, one could compare their subjective expected rank to their true expected rank and/or their beliefs in the Piece-Rate round. Our results are qualitatively the same with these alternative measures of overconfidence.

¹⁰Both males and females significantly overestimate their probability of ranking first according to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests ($p < 0.001$)

petitiveness, it is to be expected that this decision will also be affected by ability, beliefs about relative performance, and risk preferences.¹¹ Thus, we use additional data about the students' beliefs and characteristics to construct a series of residual competitiveness measures which net out each student's ability, performance beliefs, and risk preferences. To test the robustness of our competitiveness measures, we also construct an alternative measure based on Buser et al. (2013).

Since risk preferences differ systematically in the population, we use CRRA utility to incorporate the data on heterogeneous risk preferences.¹² Let q_i be the number of sums i answered correctly in the Tournament round. Recall that the piece-rate compensation scheme pays \$0.50 per sum with certainty while the tournament compensation scheme pays \$2.00 per sum if the student is ranked first in her group and nothing otherwise. Then, the utility of the piece-rate (P) compensation scheme is $U_i^P(q_i) = (0.50 \times q_i)^{1-\rho_i} / (1 - \rho_i)$, and the expected utility of the tournament (T) compensation scheme is $EU_i^T(q_i, p_i^{1st}) = p_i^{1st} (2.00 \times q_i)^{1-\rho_i} / (1 - \rho_i)$, where ρ_i is i 's CRRA coefficient obtained from the risk elicitation task and p_i^{1st} is i 's subjective belief of being ranked first in her group in the Tournament round.¹³ Utility-maximizing students choose the tournament compensation scheme if $EU_i^T \geq U_i^P$, and the piece-rate compensation scheme otherwise. Now, let τ_i be a dummy that equals 1 if i chooses the tournament compensation scheme in the Choice task and 0 otherwise. Our

¹¹There is evidence of positive selection into the tournament for each of these variables. Students who choose the tournament compensation scheme have a higher performance in the Tournament round, a higher belief of being ranked first, and a lower CRRA coefficient (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, $p < 0.005$). See the Appendix for further analysis of the tournament entry decision.

¹²We also tried a measure of competitiveness assuming a linear utility function, which imposes risk neutrality for all students. Suggesting an important role of heterogeneous risk preferences in the measure of competitiveness, our results are weaker with linear utility.

¹³Technically, the belief that matters when deciding whether to pick the tournament compensation scheme or not is the probability that one's expected performance in the Choice round (conditional on choosing tournament) ranks first when compared with the performance of other group members in the Tournament round. However, as long as students expect to perform at least as well as in the Tournament round, their beliefs about relative performance in the Tournament round are sufficient to capture the relevant beliefs for the tournament entry decision in the Choice round.

first measure of competitiveness is then:

$$\text{Competitiveness}_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \tau_i = 1 \text{ and } EU_i^T < U_i^P, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_i = 1 \text{ and } EU_i^T \geq U_i^P, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_i = 0 \text{ and } EU_i^T \leq U_i^P, \\ -1 & \text{if } \tau_i = 0 \text{ and } EU_i^T > U_i^P. \end{cases}$$

In words, a student is overly competitive if she enters the tournament when she should not and is averse to competition when the converse is true. The remaining “neutral” students make the *correct* choice, that is, enter the tournament when they should (based on utility maximization) and do not enter when they should not.

Our second measure of competitiveness follows the same logic as the first, but it uses the additional information contained in the actual difference in utilities between the two compensation schemes. Note that, among students classified as overly competitive, the difference $U_i^P - EU_i^T$ equals the amount of utility that i gives up by choosing the tournament compensation scheme, and therefore it serves as an indication of how competitive i is. Similarly, among students classified as averse to competition, $EU_i^T - U_i^P$ serves as an indication of how averse to competition i is. Based on this observation, we construct the following variable:

$$\text{Competitiveness rank}_i = \begin{cases} R_i^+(U_i^P - EU_i^T) & \text{if } \tau_i = 1 \text{ and } EU_i^T < U_i^P, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_i = 1 \text{ and } EU_i^T \geq U_i^P, \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_i = 0 \text{ and } EU_i^T \leq U_i^P, \\ -R_i^-(EU_i^T - U_i^P) & \text{if } \tau_i = 0 \text{ and } EU_i^T > U_i^P, \end{cases}$$

where $R_i^+(\cdot)$ ranks the competitiveness of i among the overly competitive students (the least competitive gets rank 1) and $R_i^-(\cdot)$ ranks i 's aversion to competition among the students who are averse to competition (the least averse gets rank 1). In other words, a student obtains a high (positive) competitiveness rank if she enters the tournament and the difference in utilities $U_i^P - EU_i^T$ is large compared to others, and a low (negative) competitiveness rank if she

does not enter the tournament and the difference in utilities $U_i^P - EU_i^T$ is low compared to others. Students who make the correct entry choice obtain a competitiveness rank of zero. We use ranks as opposed to the actual differences in utilities because the nonlinear nature of the CRRA functional form produces outliers in the distribution of competitiveness.

If we look at the distribution of competitiveness, we find that 58% of the students make the correct or neutral choice, about 28% are classified as averse to competition, and the remaining 14% are classified as overly competitive. We also see a clear gender difference: 32% of female students compete “too little” versus only 21% of male students and only 11% of females compete “too much” versus 17% of males. Panel B in Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of our two measures of competitiveness. The means are negative due to there being more individuals who are averse to competition than individuals who are overly competitive. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that males are significantly more competitive than females in both measures. Thus, consistent with previous literature (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011), we find that men are more competitive than women, even after ones takes into account differences in ability, performance beliefs, and risk preferences.

An alternative measure of competitiveness As an alternative to our measures of competitiveness, we consider a measure based on Buser et al. (2013). It consists of first regressing the tournament entry choice (τ_i) on the number of correct sums in the Tournament round (q_i), the subjective probability of being ranked first in the Tournament round (p_i^{1st}), and the CRRA coefficient (ρ_i). The residual of this regression for each student is then used as an indication of how competitive that student is. This measure of competitiveness implicitly assumes that each of these determinants affect tournament entry in a linear and separable way. This is in contrast to the measure described above, which incorporates beliefs and risk preferences in a non-separable way through maximization of expected utility. The mean and standard deviation of the alternative competitiveness variable, which we call “Residual competitiveness”, is available in Table 2. It is positive for males, indicating that the average male student is competitive, and negative for females, indicating the

opposite for the average female student. Like the measures of competitiveness constructed above, this measure also differs significantly by gender with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test ($p = 0.022$).

Experimental measures and sample characteristics Do demographic characteristics explain the variation in the experimentally derived measures of risk preferences, overconfidence, and competitiveness? Our experimental measures become less important in some sense if student background characteristics are good proxies for them. To test whether there is a relationship between the sample characteristics presented in subsection 2 and the experimental measures derived above, we estimate a series of regressions using each of our experimental measures as the dependent variable and including all the demographic variables in Table 1 as regressors. None of these regressions have a significant F-statistic for joint significance of the included demographic variables ($p = 0.249$ for risk aversion, $p = 0.132$ for overconfidence, $p = 0.263$ for competitiveness, and $p = 0.131$ for competitiveness rank), indicating that, besides gender, observable characteristics such as age, race, parental income and education, SAT scores, and university grades, etc., are not good predictors of our experimental measures. This is perhaps not unsurprising given the construction of our key experimental variables: our confidence measure is constructed based on the student’s beliefs about his or her performance net of the student’s true performance; and our competitiveness measure is constructed taking into account heterogeneity in risk preferences and the student’s subjective beliefs. Therefore, our analysis suggests that our experimental measures capture independent variation in individual characteristics that would be otherwise unobservable in standard datasets.

4 Expectations about future earnings

In this section, we first establish that there is an important gender gap in expectations about future earnings, and then, we investigate whether our experimental measures of risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness help explain this gender difference.




Figure 1: Expected earnings distributions by gender

Note: The bars show the actual distribution of expected earnings while the dashed lines show the same distributions using lowess smoothing. Expected earnings are in \$1000s.

4.1 Gender differences in earnings expectations

We elicit the students’ expectations about their own earnings at ages 30 and 45 conditional on graduating in each major category as follows: “*If you received a Bachelor’s degree in each of the following major categories and you were working full time when you are 30 [45] years old, what do you believe is the average amount that you would earn per year?*”. To ensure consistency of the reported expectation across students, we provide a definition of working full time (“working at least 35 hours per week and 45 weeks per year”) and instruct them to ignore the effects of price inflation. We also asked them to incorporate in their response the possibility they might receive an advanced/graduate degree by age 30 (45).¹⁴ Given the questions condition on full time/full year labor force participation, our measure of expected earnings is free from biases associated with different labor supply expectations.

We start by analyzing the students’ expectations about future earnings for their chosen major, i.e., their actual expected earnings as opposed to the

¹⁴We use a series of practice questions to familiarize the students with the format of these types of questions.

counterfactual expected earnings for majors not chosen.¹⁵ Figure 1 depicts the distributions of these expectations at ages 30 and 45 for both males and females. As is typical for realized earnings distributions, the distributions are positively skewed. It is also clear that the expected earnings distribution of males is shifted to the right and displays a thicker right tail. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms that the distributions of expected earnings differ significantly by gender ($p < 0.001$ both at age 30 and age 45).

The gender differences in expected earnings can also be seen in Panel A of Table 3. In addition to their expected earnings, the table also displays the change in each student’s expected earnings from age 30 to age 45 (labeled “Growth in expected earnings”). For each expectation, the table reports the mean and standard deviation by gender, the difference in means between males and females, and the p -value of testing for equality of means between males and females.¹⁶ As we can see, female students clearly expect to earn less than male students and this difference increases with age: on average, females expect to earn around 31% less at age 30, which increases to 39% less by age 45.

While the preceding analysis deals with students’ beliefs about their *own* future earnings, in order to assess how much the students know about the current *population* distribution of earnings, we also asked for each student’s belief about the average earnings of 30-year old individuals of their own gender who graduated with a degree from the same major category as the student (labeled “Expected population earnings”).¹⁷ We compare this to the actual average earnings of the equivalent major \times gender group (labeled “True population earnings”), which we computed from the *National Survey of College Graduates*. Comparing the students’ expectations about their own earnings with their beliefs about population earnings reveals that students believe their

¹⁵For younger students, their “chosen” major refers to the major that they report they intend to major in.

¹⁶Since a few outliers may unduly affect our results, all expectations are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. Results are qualitatively similar and gender differences are in fact stronger if we do not winsorize.

¹⁷The precise wording of the question is “*Among all male [female] college graduates currently aged 30 who work full time and received a Bachelor’s degree in each of the following major categories, what is the average amount that you believe these workers currently earn per year?*”.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics for expected earnings

Note: For each expectation, the first two columns report the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) by gender. The third column reports the difference between males and females and the rightmost column reports the p -value of testing for equality of distributions between genders based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. All expectations are in \$1000s and are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.

	Males	Females	Diff.	p-value
PANEL A: CONDITIONAL ON THEIR CHOSEN MAJOR				
Exp. earnings at age 30	110.79 (76.21)	76.32 (40.96)	34.47	0.001
Exp. earnings at age 45	165.49 (143.76)	100.89 (72.08)	64.61	0.001
Growth in exp. earnings	45.86 (72.55)	22.86 (41.40)	23.01	0.114
Exp. population earnings (age 30)	73.11 (36.10)	61.27 (25.69)	11.84	0.016
True population earnings (age 30)	66.25	53.67	12.58	
True population earnings (age 45)	105.40	65.29	40.11	
PANEL B: MEAN OVER ALL MAJOR CATEGORIES				
Exp. earnings at age 30	85.32 (40.92)	69.21 (27.50)	16.11	0.002
Exp. earnings at age 45	117.48 (78.78)	89.88 (47.89)	27.61	0.007
Growth in exp. earnings	31.62 (41.27)	19.37 (27.64)	12.25	0.072
Exp. population earnings (age 30)	59.53 (17.45)	56.87 (19.97)	2.67	0.075
True population earnings (age 30)	61.97	51.13	10.84	
True population earnings (age 45)	109.13	69.60	39.53	

earnings will be much higher than the average US college graduate of the same gender and major. This is not surprising given that the students in our sample are drawn from a selective private university and, as revealed by the high average SAT scores and GPA, are of high ability.

One possible reason for the gender difference in earnings expectations is that men and women are misinformed about the distribution of earnings. Table 3 shows that students' beliefs about the gender gap in average population earnings are quite similar to the true gender gap.¹⁸ Female students believe average earnings for 30 year old women in their chosen major are 16% less than those of what male students believe average earnings are for men in their chosen major. The student's beliefs about the major-specific gender gap are actually not far from the actual 19% gender gap in the US census data. In

¹⁸Our sample of students is still too young for us to test the relationship between expected and realized earnings directly.

other words, we find no evidence that the gender gap in earnings beliefs is mainly driven by systematic misperceptions about population earnings.¹⁹

As noted above, an important component of the gender gap in earnings among college graduates is that men and women choose very different fields of study, with men choosing higher paying majors. Therefore, the gender difference in earnings expectations in Panel A of Table 3 may simply be because of the different major composition by gender. An important characteristic of our dataset is that we gathered the students' expected earnings for *all* major categories (Business and economics, Humanities and other social sciences, Natural sciences and math, and Never graduate/drop out), not just for the one they have chosen. This allows us to decompose the gender gap in expected earnings using the student's expectations for each major directly rather than make assumptions regarding the counterfactual earnings a student would expect in majors not chosen. In contrast to Panel A of Table 3, which computes expectations for the one major chosen, Panel B of Table 3 computes expected earnings for each student by simply averaging each student's expected earnings across all major categories (i.e., weighting each major choice equally). This is equivalent to computing expected earnings by first randomly assigning major choices to the students rather than using the students' self-selected major.

Comparing Panel A and B of Table 3 then allows us to assess how much self-selection affects expected future earnings, and therefore, how much of the gender gap in expected earnings is due to men and women choosing different fields. We find that even if majors are randomly assigned, female students still expect to earn significantly less than male students (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, $p \leq 0.007$). However, the difference between genders narrows considerably: from \$34.47k (31%) to \$16.11k (19%) at age 30, and from \$64.61k (39%) to \$27.61k (23%) at age 45.²⁰ In other words, differences in major choices

¹⁹This is not to say that there are no systematic biases in our students' expected population earnings. We observe that both males and females overestimate the level of population earnings by around \$7k, i.e., the average error (belief - truth) is about \$7k. We simply find a small difference between the perceived gender gap in average earnings and the true gender gap.

²⁰By taking the average across all major categories we are giving each major equal weight. However, other weights lead to a similar result. For instance, if we weight expected earnings

account for around one third of the gender gap in expected earnings, which leaves the remaining two thirds to differences in expected earnings *within* each major. Hence, we conduct our subsequent analysis in two steps. First, we examine the relation between the students’ expected earnings and their level of risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness, irrespective of their chosen major. Second, we examine the relation between the students’ major choice and these experimental measures.

4.2 Experimental measures and expected earnings

To examine whether the students’ beliefs about future earnings are systematically correlated with their preferences for risk, overconfidence, and competitiveness, we estimate regressions of the form $Earn_{k,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Male_i + \beta_2 CRRA_i + \beta_3 Overconfidence_i + \beta_4 Competitiveness_i + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_{k,i}$, where $Earn_{k,i}$ is i ’s subjective belief about earnings in major category k , where $k = \text{Business, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Drop out}$;²¹ $Male_i$ is a dummy that equals one if i is male; $CRRA_i$ is i ’s coefficient of relative risk aversion; $Overconfidence_i$ is i ’s overestimation of her probability of ranking first; $Competitiveness_i$ is i ’s level of competitiveness according to either our first or second measure; X_i is a vector of control variables; and $\epsilon_{k,i}$ is the error term. Except for our measures of competitiveness, we standardize the continuous independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. Thus, the constant can be interpreted as the earnings belief of an average female student who is neither overly competitive nor averse to competition. We use the students’ beliefs across all major categories and cluster standard errors at the individual level.

Table 4 presents the estimates of our regressions. We use two different dependent variables: the students’ expected earnings at age 30 and at age 45. To minimize the likelihood of outliers driving our results, we winsorize the depen-

based on the observed distribution of chosen majors, the gender gap narrows to \$24.00k (23%) at age 30 and \$38.60k (27%) at age 45.

²¹We also ask students about earnings in Engineering. However, as mentioned above, this is a very small major at NYU, and so we do not include beliefs about this field in the analysis. Results are qualitatively similar if we include beliefs about earnings in Engineering in the analysis.

Table 4: The gender gap in expected earnings

Note: OLS estimate with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. The dependent variables are in \$1000s and are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. All regressions have 4 observations for each of the 229 students, resulting in a total of 916 observations. ***, **, *, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Independent variables	Expected earnings at age 30						Expected earnings at age 45					
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Male	16.11*** (5.06)	14.33*** (5.29)	14.34*** (5.02)	14.22** (4.93)	12.23** (5.28)	11.94** (5.19)	27.61*** (9.57)	24.07*** (9.45)	25.01*** (8.98)	25.05*** (8.95)	20.05** (8.98)	19.58** (8.84)
Competitiveness		5.67 (3.58)			5.43 (3.62)			12.90* (6.75)		13.85** (6.92)		
Competitiveness rank				0.24** (0.11)		0.24* (0.12)				0.46** (0.23)		0.55** (0.25)
Overconfidence			4.15** (2.05)	4.37** (2.06)	4.20* (2.23)	4.44** (2.25)		6.48* (3.44)		6.77* (3.48)	7.61** (3.26)	8.07** (3.31)
CRRR coefficient			1.20 (2.27)	3.22 (2.71)	0.54 (2.16)	2.61 (2.73)		4.54 (3.53)		8.23* (4.67)	2.47 (3.46)	7.05 (4.68)
Constant	69.21*** (2.26)	68.48*** (3.95)	70.68*** (2.48)	71.71*** (2.65)	71.39*** (2.50)	72.53*** (2.69)	89.88*** (3.93)	88.53*** (7.79)	92.71*** (4.35)	94.35*** (4.72)	94.60*** (4.31)	96.97*** (4.84)
Controls	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.10

dent variable at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.²² For each dependent variable we run six regressions. In column I, we include only $Male_i$ as an independent variable. As expected, the coefficient of $Male_i$ is positive and statistically significant in both regressions, confirming the existence of a gender gap in expected earnings. In column II, we include the additional demographics control variables described in subsection 2.²³ The inclusion of these variables, including SAT scores, race, and family background characteristics, reduces the gender gap in expectations by about 11 and 13 percent (for age 30 and 45 expectations, respectively).

In columns III and IV, we add our experimental measures for risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness (III uses the first measure of competitiveness and IV uses the second). These regressions show a systematic relation between expected earnings and both overconfidence and competitiveness. Higher levels of overconfidence are associated with higher expected earnings at ages 30 and 45. Specifically, a one-standard deviation increase in overconfidence is associated with a significant increase in expected earnings of around \$4.20k at age 30 (6% more than the baseline) and around \$6.60k at age 45 (7% more).²⁴

Similarly, we find a positive relation between competitiveness and expected earnings. With our first measure of competitiveness, the effect has a higher level of significance for age 45 than age 30 earnings ($p = 0.115$ for age 30 and $p = 0.057$ for age 45). With our second measure of competitiveness, the significance of the coefficient improves in both the age 30 and age 45 regressions (to $p = 0.041$ and $p = 0.048$, respectively).²⁵ The sign of the estimates for

²²Our results are qualitatively similar if we instead winsorize at the 5th and 95th percentiles, or if we use log earnings. We prefer using earnings in levels, since the regression estimates have a more straightforward interpretation

²³Specifically, we include all the variables in Table 1 except for GPA, which suffers from obvious causality problems. Moreover, since the students' beliefs in the survey might be affected by their experience in the preceding experiment (e.g. because of changes in their mood, Schwarz and Clore, 1983), we also include their experimental earnings.

²⁴Note that although the relation between overconfidence and expected earnings might not be too surprising, it is insightful to know that it helps explain part of the gender difference in earnings expectations. Moreover, given the self-fulfilling nature of earnings expectations, overconfident beliefs might nevertheless lead to realized earnings differences.

²⁵We obtain results in the same direction with the residuals measure of competitiveness. Specifically, we obtain a positive coefficient in the regression for earnings at age 30 as well

both measures of competitiveness indicates that competitiveness is positively related to earnings expectations. The interpretation of the coefficients on the first measure of competitiveness is that individuals who are overly competitive (averse to competition) expect age 30 earnings to be about \$5.5k higher (lower) and age 45 earnings to be \$13k higher (lower) than competitively “neutral” individuals. In the Appendix, we show that the effect of competitiveness is driven by the low earnings expectations of students who are averse to competition as opposed to high earning expectations by overly competitive students.

In columns V and VI, we include both the experimental measures and demographics control variables. These regressions show that the positive and statistically significant effects of overconfidence and competitiveness are unaffected by the inclusion of a large set of control variables, with the effect of overconfidence increasing somewhat, especially for age 45 earnings expectations. This robustness to the inclusion of control variables is consistent with our previous results of no statistically significant relationship between demographic controls and our experimental measures.

By and large, we do not find a significant relation between earnings expectations and risk aversion. The coefficient of $CRRA_i$ is significant only in column IV for earnings at age 45, but the significance disappears once we add controls in columns V and VI.

Lastly, note that including the experimental measures in the regressions reduces the magnitude of the coefficient of $Male_i$, indicating that part of the gender gap in expected earnings can be accounted for by these variables. Specifically, with the inclusion of these variables, the gender gap narrows by around 16.7% for age 30 expectations (from a male coefficient of \$14.33k to \$11.94k in models with control variables) and around 18.7% for age 45 expectations (from \$24.07k to \$19.58).

How large are these magnitudes? One way to judge their importance is to compare the relative magnitude of the reduction in the gender gap from our experimental measures to that from the inclusion of the more standard

as the regression for earnings at age 45, although the coefficient is statistically significant only in the former ($p = 0.060$ and $p = 0.375$, respectively).

demographic variables. Comparing the reduction in the $Male_i$ coefficient in columns I and II vs. columns I and III (or IV) indicates that our three experimental measures reduce the gender gap by about as much as the demographic variables for age 30 expectations, and about $\frac{3}{4}$ as much as the demographic variables for age 45 expectations. That our three experimental measures explain a similar proportion of the gender differences as a rich set of variables capturing ability and family background, variables including SAT scores and family income, is suggestive that these experimental measures are key elements of the gender gap. That these experimental measures are uncorrelated with these same demographic variables suggests further that the experimental measures are capturing individual characteristics that are not otherwise well proxied by standard variables. Note however, that even though the coefficient of $Male_i$ decreases further when we include both experimental and demographic control variables, there is still a significant gender gap in expected earnings that is unaccounted for by these variables. We conclude that although our experimental measures (and additional control variables) are important to our understanding of gender differences in earnings expectations, they are only part of the explanation.²⁶

5 Major choice

We turn to the second part of our analysis, and examine whether the students' levels of risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness help explain gender differences in major choice. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the students' major choice. Most students choose a major in the "Humanities and other social sciences" (henceforth *humanities*), followed by "Business and economics" (henceforth *business*), and then "Natural sciences and math" (henceforth *natural sciences*). However, there is a strong and significant gender difference in their choice of a college major (χ^2 test, $p = 0.002$): while 48.1% of the male students major in business and only 37.0% major in humanities,

²⁶In the Appendix, we exploited our survey data to test a number of alternative explanations for the relationships we observe between competitiveness and overconfidence and earnings expectations. We find no statistically significant relationship between overconfidence and overcompetitiveness and i) beliefs about average population earnings, ii) expected labor supply, and iii) expected earnings uncertainty.




Figure 2: Major category distributions by gender

60.1% of females major in humanities and only 26.4% major in business.

5.1 Student perceptions of college majors

Before analyzing their major choice, we use questions from the survey to look at how students perceive the riskiness, difficulty, returns, and competitiveness of jobs in each major category. Descriptive statistics for these questions are shown in Table 5.

The first variable in the table serves as a measure of difficulty. Specifically, it is the expected number of study hours students need to graduate with a GPA of 4.0 in a major category.²⁷ According to this measure, both males and females consider the natural sciences the most difficult, followed by business, which leaves humanities as the least difficult major category. Given that overconfident students consider themselves as more capable than others, if overconfidence plays a role in their major choice then we ought to see that students from the natural sciences are more overconfident.

Our survey design also included a number of variables to measure the students' perceptions about the level of competition in jobs within a major category. The next three rows of Table 5 describe various measures of a major's

²⁷The wording of the question is “*How many hours per week do you think you would need to spend studying (excluding class time) in each of the following major categories in order to achieve an average GPA in that major category of 4.0?*”. The mean and standard deviation of this variable are 32.53 and 19.44 hours.

competitiveness, namely: (1) the importance of relative performance for job compensation, (2) the probability of being fired, and (3) the fraction of male employees.²⁸ Table 5 shows that both male and female students expect jobs in business to be the most competitive. According to the ratio of bonus pay and the fraction of male employees, jobs in natural sciences are the second most competitive and jobs in the humanities are the least competitive. This ordering reverses for the probability of being fired, where jobs in natural sciences are considered the safest and jobs in the humanities the second safest. Hence, if competitiveness matters for major choice, we ought to see a higher fraction of underconfident students in the humanities compared to business and to a lesser extent the natural sciences.

The second to last variable in Table 5 gives us an indication of the variability of the earnings expectations of each student in each major category, and reports the standard deviation in earnings (which, as explained in the Appendix, is obtained from fitting the three points on the students' earnings beliefs distribution to a log-normal distribution). Compared to humanities, both males and females consider business to have more variable earnings and females think the same is true for the natural sciences. Hence, if risk aversion plays a role in major choice then we ought to see that risk averse students self-select themselves into the humanities.

Finally, Table 5 also reports the student's beliefs about the average population earnings for each major. Both males and females believe average earnings for business majors are the highest, with males reporting average earnings for a 30-year-old male full time worker of about \$85k, compared to natural sciences with \$67k and humanities with \$53k. Female beliefs about the average earnings of female workers are quite similar. While it is difficult to conclude that

²⁸The precise wording of the questions is: (1) “*What do you believe would be the average amount of bonus pay based on relative performance (as a percent of your annual base pay) among the job offers you receive at age 30 if you received a Bachelor’s degree in each of the following major categories?*”, (2) “*What do you believe would be the percent chance of being fired or laid off in the next year from positions similar to those from which you would receive job offers at age 30 if you received a Bachelor’s degree in each of the following major categories?*”, and (3) “*What do you believe would be the proportion of men in positions similar to those from which you would receive job offers at age 30 if you received a Bachelor’s degree in each of the following major categories?*”.

Table 5: Student Perceptions about Majors

Note: The table reports mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). Earnings expectations are in \$1000s and are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. For each variable and gender, the last column reports the statistical significance of pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum (WSR) tests comparing the three major categories: \ggg , \gg , and $>$ indicate a significant difference at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; \approx indicates no significant difference at 10%; major categories are identified by their initial.

		Business		Humanities		Natural sciences		WRS tests
Study hours needed for a 4.0 GPA	Males	21.10	(14.44)	17.65	(14.04)	26.59	(16.14)	N \ggg B \ggg H
	Females	25.57	(12.73)	19.74	(10.52)	28.27	(13.77)	N \ggg B \ggg H
Fraction of salary based on relative performance	Males	0.47	(0.55)	0.13	(0.27)	0.14	(0.20)	B \ggg N \ggg H
	Females	0.39	(0.50)	0.16	(0.25)	0.18	(0.27)	B \ggg N \ggg H
Probability of being fired	Males	0.15	(0.19)	0.10	(0.10)	0.08	(0.09)	B \gg H \ggg N
	Females	0.18	(0.17)	0.18	(0.17)	0.13	(0.14)	B \approx H \ggg N
Fraction of male employees	Males	0.62	(0.15)	0.43	(0.15)	0.54	(0.18)	B \ggg N \ggg H
	Females	0.62	(0.16)	0.41	(0.13)	0.55	(0.17)	B \ggg N \ggg H
Exp. earnings uncertainty	Males	54.45	(46.05)	38.90	(30.52)	42.51	(35.09)	B \gg N \approx H
	Females	45.39	(36.30)	36.12	(33.07)	43.74	(34.29)	B \approx N \ggg H
Exp. population earnings	Males	85.49	(36.28)	52.74	(15.11)	67.30	(22.45)	B \ggg N \ggg H
	Females	81.32	(33.79)	52.18	(21.97)	65.21	(30.29)	B \ggg N \ggg H

these beliefs uniquely reflect beliefs about the difficulty or competitiveness of the major, the ordering of majors is the same as for other major characteristics.

5.2 Experimental measures and major choice

To evaluate whether major choice is systematically correlated with our experimental measures of individual attributes, we estimate alternative-specific conditional logit models (McFadden, 1974), where we allow the latent utility of each major choice to depend on characteristics of the major, characteristics of the student, and interactions of major and student characteristics. The latent utility to individual i from completing major k is given by

$$V_{k,i} = \gamma_k + \beta_k X_i + \alpha Y_{i,k} + \epsilon_{k,i}, \quad (1)$$

where γ_k is a major-specific fixed effect; X_i is a set of variables that vary only across individuals (e.g., gender); $Y_{i,k}$ is a vector of variables that vary across

major categories within the same individual (e.g., each student’s expected future earnings in each major); and $\epsilon_{k,i}$ is the error term, assumed to have an extreme value distribution that gives rise to the logit form. By allowing the coefficients β_k to vary across major categories, we allow for the individual attributes in X_i , including our experimentally derived measures of risk, competitiveness, and confidence, to have differential effects on the utility for each major.²⁹ Given the extreme value distribution assumption, the probability of completing major k is given by $p_{k,i} = \exp(\bar{V}_{k,i}) / \sum_j \exp(\bar{V}_{j,i})$, where $\bar{V}_{k,i}$ denotes $V_{k,i}$ net of $\epsilon_{k,i}$. Normalizing the model relative to a base major category \tilde{k} , we set the parameters $\gamma_{\tilde{k}} = 0$ and $\beta_{\tilde{k}} = 0$. Given equation (1), the log odds of student i completing major k relative to the baseline major \tilde{k} is then given by

$$\ln \left(\frac{p_{k,i}}{p_{\tilde{k},i}} \right) = \gamma_k + \beta_k X_i + \alpha (Y_{i,k} - Y_{i,\tilde{k}}). \quad (2)$$

Except for our measures of competitiveness, we standardize the continuous independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients.

Table 6 presents estimates and robust standard errors clustered at the individual level from seven logit models. In model I, X_i contains only a dummy indicating the students’ gender ($Male_i$) while $Y_{i,k}$ is empty. In models II and III, in addition to gender, X_i contains the experimentally derived variables that measure risk aversion ($CRRA_i$), overconfidence ($Overconfidence_i$), and either the first (model II) or second (model III) measure of competitiveness. In models IV and V, X_i also includes the additional control variables described in subsection 2 and used in Table 4. Finally, in models VI and VII, we explore the impact of earnings expectations on major choice. These models use the same specification as models IV and V except that $Y_{i,k}$ now contains i ’s earnings expectations in major k . We use earnings expectations at age 45 since they show the strongest association with competitiveness (see Table 4). To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficient, we standardize expectations to have a

²⁹Note that models in which the vector of major-specific variables $Y_{i,k}$ is empty is equivalent to a standard multinomial logit regression.

Table 6: The gender gap in major choice

Note: Odd ratios of logit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. All regressions have major and individual fixed effects, and 3 observations for each of the 229 students, resulting in a total of 687 observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Independent variables	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
BUSINESS							
Male	2.97*** (0.92)	3.39*** (1.10)	3.40*** (1.10)	3.89*** (1.50)	3.98*** (1.55)	3.31*** (1.33)	3.39*** (1.37)
Competitiveness		0.67 (0.17)		0.78 (0.22)		0.75 (0.22)	
Competitiveness rank			0.98* (0.01)		0.99 (0.01)		0.99 (0.01)
Overconfidence		0.77* (0.12)	0.76* (0.12)	0.88 (0.16)	0.87 (0.17)	0.85 (0.16)	0.85 (0.16)
CRRA coefficient		0.92 (0.14)	0.82 (0.15)	1.04 (0.17)	0.97 (0.19)	1.03 (0.16)	0.93 (0.17)
NATURAL SCIENCES							
Male	1.78 (0.75)	1.43 (0.66)	1.49 (0.68)	1.68 (0.89)	1.75 (0.92)	1.67 (0.89)	1.73 (0.91)
Competitiveness		1.16 (0.45)		1.32 (0.53)		1.30 (0.52)	
Competitiveness rank			1.00 (0.02)		1.00 (0.01)		1.00 (0.01)
Overconfidence		1.42 (0.31)	1.39 (0.30)	1.67* (0.44)	1.63* (0.43)	1.74** (0.47)	1.70** (0.46)
CRRA coefficient		0.78 (0.17)	0.77 (0.18)	0.79 (0.20)	0.80 (0.19)	0.77 (0.21)	0.78 (0.20)
MAJOR k							
Expected earnings						1.52** (0.26)	1.54** (0.27)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wald χ^2	12.32	22.32	22.12	77.71	75.49	78.86	76.28

mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

Table 6 presents odds ratios of the estimated coefficients using humanities as the omitted major. Our findings are as follows. First, we find that, as hypothesized, overconfident students are relatively more common in the natural sciences than in business or the humanities ($p < 0.045$ in VI and $p < 0.050$

in VII). Albeit, we do not find evidence of a statistically significant difference between business and the humanities ($p = 0.399$ in VI and $p = 0.387$ in VII). Second, we do not find support for our hypotheses concerning competitiveness and major choice. That is, we do not find that more competitive students are significantly over-represented in business compared to the humanities ($p = 0.337$ in VI and $p = 0.225$ in VII) or the natural sciences ($p = 0.337$ in VI and $p = 0.225$ in VII). In fact, the odds ratio for business is less than one, which is the converse of what one would expect to find since the humanities should be the least competitive major category and business the most competitive.³⁰ Third, the estimated odds ratios for the coefficient of CRRA are generally below one, which is consistent with risk averse students being less common in business and the natural sciences than in the humanities, but they are not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p > 0.333$ in VI and $p > 0.330$ in VII). Fourth, consistent with the literature on major choice, columns VI and VII both show that students select into majors that they believe will provide them with relatively higher earnings (see Arcidiacono, 2004; Arcidiacono et al., 2013; Wiswall and Zafar, 2013). The estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in expected earnings in a major relative to the baseline major increases the odds of majoring in that field by about 1.5.

Lastly, we should also note that, in contrast to what we see in the regressions in Table 4, including our experimental measures and additional control variables does not help explain the large gender difference in major choice (i.e., the lack of women majoring in business compared to humanities). In fact, the coefficient for $male_i$ increases as we add more independent variables.

Reverse Causality? Our experimental measures are collected from students after they are in college, and who have potentially been exposed to different experiences in the various majors. A potential concern in equation

³⁰In the Appendix, we separate each competitiveness measure into one for students who are averse to competition and one for students that are overly competitive. We find that compared to both business and the humanities, the natural sciences display a higher proportion of *both* overly competitive students and students who are adverse to competition. If we use the residuals measure of competitiveness, we obtain a positive coefficient for competitiveness in the natural sciences and a negative coefficient for business, with neither one being statistically significant ($p = 0.620$ and $p = 0.574$, respectively).

(2) could then be reverse causality. For example, if competitiveness is taught in certain majors, such as business, then the interpretation of estimates of equation (2) is not clear. However, if this concern were taken at its face value (that certain majors “teach” competitiveness), we would expect to find results biased in the direction of finding a systematic relationship between competitiveness and major choice. Instead, we find no evidence of that in Table 6. Nonetheless, as a further robustness test, we estimate equation (2) by excluding students who are beyond their third year in college. Arguably, younger students have more similar coursework experiences, and their choice of college major is still reversible. Estimates based on this restricted sample are very similar to those presented in Table 6, suggesting that such concerns cannot explain our results. It should also be pointed out that sunk investments in particular forms of human capital is intrinsic to the sequential nature of educational investments. Administering experiments along the lines done in this study to individuals before they attend college does not get around the concern that individuals may have different classroom experiences in earlier grades.

Why are competitiveness and overconfidence not related to major choice? Models VI and VII of Table 6 show that earnings expectations are a significant determinant of major choice. Therefore, at first, it may seem puzzling that the positive and significant relationships between earnings expectations, competitiveness, and overconfidence (documented in Section 4) do not have a stronger effect on major choice. However, closer examination reveals that the associations between the experimental measures and earnings expectations exist in *each* major category and not only for, say, their chosen major. This can be seen in Figure 3, which depicts the students’ expected earnings in each major category depending on their competitiveness and on whether they are overconfident or underconfident. To better observe the effect of competitiveness and overconfidence, expected earnings are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one *within each major category*. Since, we observe the same pattern in *all* majors, it is conceivable for competitiveness and overconfidence to affect earnings expectations and at the same time have a muted impact on major choice in spite of relative earnings af-




Figure 3: Earnings, competitiveness, and overconfidence by major category

Note: Expected earnings are standardized within each major category.

fecting the latter decision. These findings are consistent with competitiveness and overconfidence having an impact on the expected workplace trajectories of individuals conditional on major choice. In terms of the specific logit model estimated above, while α in equation (2) is significant and positive (indicating that students are more likely to choose majors which they believe have higher future earnings), the competitiveness trait reduces expectations by a roughly proportional amount for all majors, hence the $Y_{i,k} - Y_{i,\bar{k}}$ term from equation (2) does not change.

In summary, competitiveness and overconfidence help explain the gender gap in expected earnings within majors and thus might help explain gender differences within a given career (such as the glass ceiling phenomenon, Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Albrecht et al., 2003), but they do not help explain the gender gap in major choice and thus might not be good candidates to explain gender differences in career choice.

6 Conclusion

Our research combines an experiment and survey of expectations to investigate the gender gap in education choices and labor market earnings expectations. Our analysis reveals two key findings. First, we extend the prior research by showing that confidence and competitiveness, but not risk preferences, are related systematically to students' expectations about future earnings and help explain an important proportion of the gender gap in earnings expectations. Second, we show that while earnings expectations are related to major choice, there is no direct relationship between college field of study (aggregated up to broad major categories) and the experimental measures. These findings provide important insights into the underlying reasons behind the observed gender differences in the labor market outcomes such as persistent differences in occupational choice and the glass ceiling phenomenon.

At first, it may seem puzzling that earnings expectations—which are significant determinants of major choice—are positively and significantly related with competitiveness and overconfidence, yet these measures do not have a direct effect on major choice. As we show, the associations between the experimental measures and earnings expectations exist in each major category and not only for, say, the chosen major of the student. It is then conceivable for competitiveness and overconfidence to affect earnings expectations, and at the same time have a muted impact on major choice. This does raise the question of why these measures are not independently related to major choice? One possible factor is that our survey lumps majors in broad science, humanities, and business categories, which may hide important sources of heterogeneity. Within the broad fields, individuals can choose different majors and anticipate working in different occupations.³¹ However, given that males and females may choose very different occupations even within very fine occupations/majors (Goldin and Katz, 2011), it is not clear to what extent our findings would change if the categorization of majors were finer.³² It may, therefore, be eas-

³¹Note, however, that this factor also applies to the Buser et al. (2013) context, where the broad high school tracts map into fields of study in college, which then map into labor market occupations.

³²When we looked at the precise major that students are pursuing, we did not find any

ier to observe an association between the experimentally-measured individual attributes and future earnings expectations because expectations incorporate beliefs about individual-specific decisions such as pursuing a graduate degree, training investments, occupational choices, and negotiating and bargaining behavior within occupations. Our findings show that students have already internalized their level of competitiveness and confidence, and this has affected their beliefs about future labor market outcomes 10-25 years later. Therefore, the relationship between earnings expectations and the experimental measures can be seen as a kind of summary measure of the anticipated influences of these traits on future labor market choices and outcomes, regardless of the source.

Our findings also underscore the importance of combining experimental measures of individual traits with more traditional surveys of labor market behavior and beliefs.³³ We find that our experimental measures explain nearly the same proportion of the gender gap in earnings expectations as do traditional demographic variables, such as test scores and family background. In addition, we find that these same traditional demographic variables are weakly correlated with the experimental measures and therefore poor proxies, which indicates that the experimental measures provide real added value to the analysis of gender in the labor market.

Why do competitiveness and overconfidence positively relate to earnings expectations? This is an open question to which our data cannot provide a clear answer. Individuals with different levels of confidence and competitiveness may pursue different occupations on the extensive margin and more aggressively negotiate for salary on the intensive margin. Undercompetitive and underconfident individuals may anticipate choosing less remunerative occupations, even within major categories (Kleinjans, 2009).³⁴ While the occupa-

notable differences in the specific majors that the two genders are choosing within our broad major categories.

³³A small and growing literature studies the link between experimental measures and actual behavior in the field (e.g., Karlan, 2005; Ashraf et al., 2006; Benz and Meier, 2008; Sapienza et al., 2009; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Buser et al., 2013; Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa, 2013).

³⁴Flory et al. (2010), for example, find that women are less likely to apply to jobs with more competitive payment schemes.

tional distribution conditional on major can explain a large part of the earnings differences across majors (Phipps and Ransom, 2010), the mapping of majors to occupations is far from one-to-one. For example, within medicine, the proportion of female physicians differs substantially across specialties, ranging from almost 70% to less than 10% percent (Goldin and Katz, 2011). Even conditional on choosing the same occupation, undercompetitive and underconfident individuals may have different earnings trajectories because they believe they are less likely to enter and/or win tournaments (i.e., promotions in the workplace).³⁵ Undercompetitive and underconfident individuals may be less likely to negotiate earnings, which may impact their starting earnings as well as wage trajectories (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Rigdon, 2012). Finally, competitiveness and overconfidence, as measured in the lab experiments, may simply proxy for certain psychological traits. For example, Muller and Schwieren (2012) relate competitiveness to the Big Five personality traits, and find that more competitive individuals have lower degrees of neuroticism, and that neuroticism impairs performance.

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³⁵If competitive individuals are more likely to enter tournaments, it would make sense for their expected earnings to be higher. However, by entering more tournaments, their earnings uncertainty should increase. Using our measure of earnings uncertainty, we find no systematic relationship between uncertainty and overconfidence or competitiveness. This then suggests that, regardless of whether such individuals are more likely to enter tournaments or not, they believe they are more likely to win them.

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Appendices (For Online Publication)

A Complementary data analysis

In this section, we first provide a detailed analysis of the student’s choice between the tournament and the piece-rate compensation schemes in Choice round. Subsequently, we complement the analysis linking the experimental measures to earnings expectations and major choice by disaggregating each competitiveness measure into one for students who are averse to competition and one for students that are overly competitive. Thereafter, we present the regressions reported in the paper linking the experimental measures to: expected population earnings, the difference between expected and actual population earnings, the variability of the earnings expectations of each student, and the students’ expected number of working hours. Finally, we explain the precise procedure used to construct a measure of the variability of the earnings expectations of each student.

A.1 Choice between compensation schemes

Table A1 provides descriptive statistics of variables from the experiment depending on the students’ gender. The first two columns report the statistics by their chosen compensation scheme in the Choice round and the last column reports p -values from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the distributions depending on whether the student chooses the tournament or the piece-rate compensation scheme.

Overall, students who choose the tournament compensation scheme perform significantly better in all addition tasks, have significantly higher expectations of being ranked first, have significantly lower CRRA coefficients (i.e., are more risk-loving), and are significantly more overconfident. In other words, we find evidence of positive selection in terms of all these variables in who chooses tournament compensation. The difference in performance between those who choose the tournament over the piece-rate compensation scheme tends to be larger for women, whereas the difference in overconfidence tends to be larger for men.

We explore further the students’ compensation scheme choice by running

Table A1: Descriptive statistics by compensation scheme choice

Note: Means are reported in the first cell and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The rightmost column reports p -values from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the distributions depending on whether the student choose the tournament or the piece-rate compensation scheme.

		Piece- rate	Tourna- ment	p -value
Correct answers in Tournament round:	Both	11.27 (3.64)	12.89 (3.88)	0.001
	Males	12.23 (4.72)	13.33 (4.76)	0.162
	Females	10.96 (3.19)	12.42 (2.66)	0.002
Correct answers in Choice round:	Both	11.99 (3.83)	13.67 (4.32)	0.001
	Males	12.55 (4.98)	14.16 (5.06)	0.058
	Females	11.81 (3.39)	13.16 (3.36)	0.027
Correct answers in Piece-rate round:	Both	12.15 (4.10)	14.19 (4.41)	0.002
	Males	13.24 (4.86)	14.64 (5.10)	0.118
	Females	11.81 (3.78)	13.72 (3.53)	0.032
Subjective probability of ranking 1 st :	Both	0.25 (0.19)	0.51 (0.29)	0.001
	Males	0.29 (0.22)	0.58 (0.33)	0.001
	Females	0.23 (0.18)	0.43 (0.22)	0.001
CRRA coefficient:	Both	0.74 (1.11)	0.39 (0.66)	0.004
	Males	0.48 (0.68)	0.35 (0.68)	0.152
	Females	0.82 (1.21)	0.44 (0.63)	0.089
Overconfidence:	Both	0.04 (0.26)	0.17 (0.28)	0.002
	Males	0.03 (0.29)	0.20 (0.26)	0.014
	Females	0.05 (0.25)	0.15 (0.30)	0.115

four probit regressions with a dependent variable that equals one if the student chooses the tournament compensation scheme and zero otherwise. Table A2 presents the marginal effects of the estimated coefficients. In regression I, the only independent variable is a dummy indicating the students' gender ($Male_i$). In regression II, we exclude gender and include three independent variables that the students could use to make their entry decision. They are: the students' performance in the addition task prior to their decision (i.e., in the Tournament round), their subjective probability of being ranked first, and their CRRA coefficient. Regression III adds once again gender as an independent variable to evaluate the effect of the other three variables on the gender coefficient. Lastly, in regression IV, we include the control variables

Table A2: Choosing the tournament compensation scheme

Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions with robust standard errors. All regressions have 229 observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Independent variables	I	II	III	IV
Male	0.31*** (0.07)		0.18** (0.08)	0.16** (0.08)
Correct answers in Tournament round		-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Subjective probability of ranking 1 st		0.28*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.05)
CRRA coefficient		-0.07* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes
Wald χ^2	20.58	55.13	59.32	79.43

described in Table 1. All regressions are run with robust standard errors. Also, to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, we standardize the continuous independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

As expected, the coefficient for males is positive and statistically significant in regression I, indicating that men are about 30% more likely to choose the tournament compensation scheme. In regression II, we can see that the students' belief of being ranked first is the most important driver of the compensation scheme choice. For a given belief, their performance in the Tournament round is not a significant predictor of their choice. The effect of the CRRA coefficient is significant at the 10% level. Regressions III and IV show that the effects of their beliefs and risk aversion are unaffected by the inclusion of gender and a large set of control variables.

Lastly, note that the coefficient of male is considerably smaller in regression III compared to regression I, indicating that an important part of the gender gap in tournament entry is accounted for by differences in beliefs and risk preferences. However, the fact that males are still significantly more likely to choose the tournament compensation scheme shows that other explanations are also needed to fully explain this gender difference. In our paper we interpret this remaining gender gap as being driven by competitiveness.

These conclusions are not affected by the inclusion of the control variables in regression IV.

A.2 Experimental measures and expected earnings

Table A3 presents estimates from additional regressions that evaluate the association between the students' beliefs about future earnings and their risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness. We use regressions with the same structure and characteristics as the regressions presented in Table 4. For convenience, we continue the numbering of Table 4, which contains regressions I through V, and refer to regressions in Table A3 as regressions VI to IX. Regression I from Table 4 is reproduced here for convenience.

Regressions VI and VII are analogous to regressions II and III in Table 4. The only difference between them is that in regressions VI and VII we no longer assume a monotonic relation between competitiveness and expected earnings. Specifically, in regression VI we disaggregate our first measure of competitiveness into two variables: a dummy variable indicating whether a student is averse to competition and one indicating whether a student is overly competitive (i.e., the omitted category corresponds to students that made the correct or neutral choice). Similarly, in regression VII we disaggregate our second measure of competitiveness into two variables: one that equals the rank of student i among all students who are averse to competition if i is averse to competition and equals zero otherwise (the least averse gets rank 1), and another that equals i 's rank among all overly competitive students if i is overly competitive and equals zero otherwise (the least competitive gets rank 1). Finally, regressions VIII and IX are analogous to regressions IV and V in that they include additional control variables.

The regressions in Table A3 reveal that the positive relationship between earnings beliefs and competitiveness is driven by the significantly lower expected earnings of students who are averse to competition. By contrast, overly competitive students and neutral students have similar earnings expectations. Moreover, the coefficients of the other variables do not seem affected by the disaggregation of the competitiveness measures. The only notable exception is that the CRRA coefficient is now significant at the 5% level in the regressions

Table A3: The gender gap in expected earnings

Note: OLS estimate with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. The dependent variables are in \$1000s and are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. All regressions have 4 observations for each of the 229 students, resulting in a total of 916 observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Independent variables	Expected earnings at age 30									Expected earnings at age 45								
	I	VI	VII	VIII	IX	I	VI	VII	VIII	IX	I	VI	VII	VIII	IX			
Male	16.11*** (5.06)	14.36*** (5.01)	14.25** (4.92)	12.33** (5.26)	12.00** (5.17)	27.61*** (9.57)	25.06*** (8.94)	25.15*** (8.86)	20.33** (8.88)	19.80** (8.66)								
Averse to competition		-9.27* (4.89)	-0.25** (0.11)	-8.42* (4.74)	-0.26** (0.12)		-23.28*** (6.68)	-0.52*** (0.17)	-21.83*** (6.33)	-0.64*** (0.18)								
Overly competitive		0.42 (7.17)	0.16 (0.40)	1.08 (7.32)	0.14 (0.42)		-2.23 (15.90)	0.21 (0.95)	2.25 (6.33)	0.21 (0.99)								
Overconfidence		4.14** (2.05)	4.35** (2.08)	4.16* (2.24)	4.40* (2.28)		6.45* (3.47)	6.72* (3.55)	7.52** (3.31)	7.94** (3.46)								
CRRRA coefficient		1.58 (2.32)	3.43 (2.70)	0.83 (2.21)	2.86 (2.69)		5.64* (3.30)	8.94** (3.95)	3.24 (3.28)	7.95** (3.91)								
Constant	69.21*** (2.26)	72.40*** (3.21)	72.07*** (2.99)	72.79*** (3.15)	72.99*** (3.01)	89.88*** (3.93)	97.68*** (5.80)	95.58*** (5.45)	98.34*** (5.33)	98.64*** (5.37)								
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
R ²	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.10		

for expected earnings at age 45, even after adding the control variables.

A.3 Experimental measures and major choice

Table A4 presents additional regressions investigating the link between the students' major choice and their risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness. We use regressions with the same structure and characteristics as the regressions presented in Table 6. For convenience, we continue the numbering of Table 6, which contains regressions I through VII, and refer to regressions in Table A4 as regressions VIII to XI. Regression I from Table 6 is reproduced here for convenience.

Regression VIII is analogous to regression II in Table 6, the only difference being that in regression VIII we disaggregate our first measure of competitiveness into a dummy variable that indicates whether a student is averse to competition and another dummy variable that indicates whether a student is overly competitive. Similarly, regression IX is analogous to regression III except that our second measure of competitiveness is disaggregated into one variable that ranks all the students who are averse to competition and another variable that ranks all overly competitive students. Regressions X and XI are analogous to regressions VI and VII in that they include the additional control variables and the students' earnings expectations at age 45.

Like in Table 6, the regressions in Table A4 do not support our hypotheses concerning competitiveness and major choice. First, we do not find that more competitive students are significantly over-represented in business compared to the humanities. In fact, our evidence points in the opposite direction since we find that students who are averse to competition are over-represented in business. Albeit, this is a significant effect only in regression X ($p = 0.068$). Second, although we do find that overly competitive students are significantly over-represented in the natural sciences compared to the humanities, the same is true for students who are averse to competition (significantly so in regressions VIII and X). In other words, we find a non-monotonic relationship between competitiveness and choosing a natural science major.

Our other findings concerning major choice are not affected by the disaggregation of the competitiveness measures. Once again, the only notable

Table A4: The gender gap in major choice

Note: Odd ratios of logit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. All regressions have major and individual fixed effects, and 3 observations for each of the 229 students, resulting in a total of 687 observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Independent variables	I	VIII	IX	X	XI
BUSINESS					
Male	2.97*** (0.92)	3.38*** (1.09)	3.38*** (1.09)	3.17*** (1.28)	3.18*** (1.29)
Averse to competition		1.71 (0.61)	1.01 (0.01)	2.25* (0.99)	1.02 (0.01)
Overly competitive		0.81 (0.43)	0.98 (0.03)	1.47 (0.91)	1.00 (0.03)
Overconfidence		0.77* (0.12)	0.77* (0.12)	0.86 (0.16)	0.85 (0.16)
CRRA coefficient		0.90 (0.14)	0.82 (0.16)	0.97 (0.15)	0.89 (0.17)
NATURAL SCIENCES					
Male	1.78 (0.75)	1.43 (0.66)	1.41 (0.65)	1.51 (0.82)	1.56 (0.84)
Averse to competition		2.80** (1.42)	1.02 (0.01)	3.18** (1.75)	1.02 (0.01)
Overly competitive		4.71*** (2.66)	1.06** (0.02)	7.42*** (4.79)	1.07*** (0.03)
Overconfidence		1.50* (0.36)	1.47 (0.35)	1.92** (0.57)	1.84** (0.53)
CRRA coefficient		0.71* (0.14)	0.62* (0.15)	0.70 (0.17)	0.62* (0.17)
MAJOR k					
Expected earnings				1.55** (0.28)	1.56** (0.28)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Wald χ^2	12.32	27.88	26.94	82.07	82.63

exception is that the CRRA coefficient is now significant at the 10% level in regressions VIII, IX, and XI, indicating that the fraction of risk-averse students is smaller in the natural sciences compared to the humanities.

A.4 Experimental measures and other beliefs

Table A5 presents estimates from regressions that investigate whether the students' risk aversion, overconfidence, and competitiveness are correlated with their expectations concerning population earnings, the accuracy of these expectations, the variability of the students' earnings expectations, and their expected number of working hours. We use regressions with the same structure and characteristics as the regression III and IV in Table 4. We use the students' beliefs across all major categories and cluster standard errors at the individual level.

Population earnings One may argue that differences in the earnings beliefs due to overconfidence or competitiveness are a consequence of differences in the distribution of expected population earnings. In particular, it might be the case that overconfident students expect higher earnings not because they overestimate their own earnings but because they overestimate population earnings. Therefore, it is possible that beliefs about average population earnings are positively associated with competitiveness. To determine whether this is the case, we run four regressions. Specifically, in the first two regressions of Table A5 the dependent variable is the students' expected earnings in each major category for an average 30-year old individual of their own gender (see Table 3). We can see that none of the experimental variables is statistically significant ($p > 0.183$ for competitiveness, $p > 0.295$ for overconfidence, and $p > 0.156$ for the CRRA coefficient). In other words, overconfident and competitive students do not expect higher earnings because they overestimate population earnings, but instead because they think their own earnings will be much higher than those of an average graduate. The dependent variable in the next two regressions is the difference between the students' expected population earnings and the actual earnings of 30-year old graduates of the corresponding gender and major category. We see that the expected population earnings of male students are more accurate than those of female students, who tend to overestimate the earnings of female graduates. Once again, we find that none of the experimental variables is statistically significant ($p > 0.160$ for competitiveness,

Table A5: Experimental measures and other variables of interest

Note: OLS estimate with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. The dependent variables labeled “Population earnings” and “Population error” are in \$1000s and are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. All regressions have 4 observations for each of the 229 students, resulting in a total of 916 observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Independent variables	Population earnings		Population error		Earnings uncertainty		Hours of work	
	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
Male	2.86 (2.57)	2.65 (2.56)	-7.50*** (2.60)	-7.71*** (2.59)	13.43** (6.30)	12.98** (6.28)	0.21 (1.12)	0.23 (1.11)
Competitiveness	0.61 (1.67)		0.70 (1.68)		-2.67 (4.57)		0.41 (1.18)	
Competitiveness rank		0.07 (0.05)		0.08 (0.06)		0.01 (0.15)		0.01 (0.03)
Overconfidence	1.05 (1.16)	1.21 (1.15)	1.03 (1.17)	1.20 (1.17)	3.15 (2.54)	3.38 (2.53)	-0.92 (0.84)	-0.92 (0.85)
CRRRA coefficient	1.84 (1.81)	2.63 (1.85)	1.84 (1.77)	2.68 (1.81)	-1.71 (3.26)	-1.20 (3.88)	0.66* (0.37)	0.69 (0.48)
Constant	56.89*** (1.66)	57.44*** (1.75)	5.73*** (1.65)	6.31*** (1.73)	54.44*** (3.39)	55.08*** (3.47)	47.57*** (0.89)	47.56*** (0.92)
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03

$p > 0.308$ for overconfidence, and $p > 0.141$ for the CRRA coefficient). Thus, the higher earnings expectations of overconfident and competitive students are not due to inaccurate expectations about population earnings.

Earnings uncertainty Competitive individuals may have higher earnings expectations if they expect to enter more tournaments. However, if they overenter tournaments, they are also likely to have higher earnings uncertainty. In addition to their expected mean earnings, our survey also asked students about the probability that their earnings will exceed \$35k and \$85k in each major category. The precise wording of the questions is: “*What do you believe is the percent chance that you would earn: (1) at least \$85,000 per year, (2) at least \$35,000 per year, when you are 30 years old if you worked full time and you received a Bachelor’s degree in each of the following major categories?*”. A student’s answers to these questions provide some information on beliefs about the expected variance in her future earnings. To provide a direct measure of variance, we calculate each student’s standard deviation of future earnings assuming the earnings expectations of student i for major category k follows a log-normal distribution with mean $\mu_{i,k}$ and variance $\sigma_{i,k}^2$, and compute the value of $\sigma_{i,k}^2$ that best fits with the three data points that we elicit from each student and for each major (see the subsequent subsection for a detailed description of how we constructed this variable).

To determine whether competitive and overconfident students perceive higher earnings uncertainty, in the third pair of regressions of Table A5 we use the student’s earnings’ standard deviations $\sigma_{i,k}$ as the dependent variable. We find that, on average, male students expect higher earnings uncertainty than female students ($p = 0.034$ in I and $p = 0.040$ in II). However, none of the coefficients of the experimental variables is statistically significant ($p > 0.560$ for competitiveness, $p > 0.182$ for overconfidence, and $p > 0.599$ for the CRRA coefficient). Thus, while overconfident and competitive students expect higher earnings, they do not expect higher earnings uncertainty. This would suggest that, if such individuals are more likely to enter tournaments at work then they must also expect to win more of them.

Labor supply Another possibility is that overconfident and competitive students expect higher earnings because they expect to work more hours. Our survey elicited the average number of hours students expected to be working, conditional on working full time at age 30.^{A1}

To determine whether competitive and overconfident students expect to work more, in the last pair of regressions of Table A5 we use the number of hours students’ expect to work per week in each of the major categories as the dependent variable. We find that the coefficient for overconfidence is negative and is not statistically significant ($p > 0.297$). Similarly, both our measures of competitiveness are unrelated with expected work hours ($p > 0.788$ for both measures). Thus, overconfident and competitive students do not display higher expected earnings because they expect to work more. It should also be pointed out that the results in Table 4 remain qualitatively unaffected, if we add expected number of work hours as a control.

A.5 Variance in expected earnings

We use the students’ expected earnings at age 30, their subjective probability that their earnings will exceed \$35k at age 30, and their subjective probability that their earnings will exceed \$85k at age 30 to get an indication of the variance of the expected earnings distribution of each student in each major category.

Specifically, from these three data points, we estimate a log-normal distribution approximation to individual beliefs about the distribution of earnings. For each individual i , we assume beliefs about earnings in major k follow $\ln Earn_{i,k} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_{i,k}, \sigma_{i,k}^2)$. The individual-specific beliefs parameters consist of $\omega_{i,k} = [\mu_{i,k}, \sigma_{i,k}]$. We compute the best fitting parameters to approximate the assumed distribution using simulation. For any given parameter vector $\omega_{i,k}$, we form a sequence of simulated earnings beliefs draws. From this sequence of earnings draws, we construct the simulated counterpart to the three statistics detailed above. We then choose the $\omega_{i,k}$ parameters that minimize

^{A1}The precise wording of the question is: “If you received a Bachelor’s degree in each of the following major categories and you were working full time when you are 30 years old, what do you believe is the average number of hours you would work per week?”.

the quadratic distance between the simulated and actual data beliefs. Note that we compute $\omega_{i,k}$ for all individual and major categories.

B Experimental procedures and instructions

In this section, we first provide a detailed description of the experimental procedures. Subsequently, we provide the instructions given to students.

B.1 Procedures

Students were informed that the study consisted of a simple economic experiment and a survey about educational and career choices. We used standard experimental procedures, including anonymity and neutrally worded instructions. The experiment took 45 minutes and was followed by the survey, which took 30 minutes to complete.

In addition to earnings from the experiment, students were given a \$10 show-up fee and received \$20 for successfully completing the survey. Total compensation varied between \$31 and \$82, with an average of \$43. Fifteen sessions were held in total. Each session had between 8 and 24 students. Detailed procedures and the instructions of the experiment are available in the supplementary materials.

The computerized experiment was conducted in May 2012 in the CESS Computer Lab of New York University. Participants for the experiment were recruited through two methods: (i) students who had participated in a survey conducted in 2010 and had consented to take part in follow-up studies were contacted by email (the previous survey is analyzed in Wiswall and Zafar, 2013), and (ii) students were recruited from the email list used by the Center for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) at NYU. Of the 246 students in which we base our data analysis, 137 students were new recruits and the remaining 109 students were participants from the first survey.^{B2} Upon agreeing to participate, students could sign up for a 90-minute session. The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).

^{B2}Of the 365 respondents of the first survey, 115 participated in the experiment (6 were engineering students and therefore excluded from the data analysis). Note that the response rate of $\frac{115}{365} = 31.5\%$ is a lower bound, since some of the students who participated in 2010 could have graduated by the time we conducted the experiment.

After their arrival, students drew a card to be randomly assigned to a seat in the laboratory. Once seated, the students read and signed the study's consent form. Thereafter, they were given the instructions of the experiment. Students were informed that they will be randomly assigned to groups of four and that the experiment consisted of eight rounds, one of which will be randomly chosen for payment at the end of the study.

At this point, the students read the instructions and performed each round of the experiment. They received the instructions for a round only after everyone had completed the previous round. In some of the rounds, students performed an adding task. It consisted of solving sums of four two-digit numbers (e.g., $84 + 52 + 31 + 77$). The two-digit numbers were randomly drawn, with the same draw for all students in a group. After each answer, students could see whether their answer was correct and their total number of correct answers. While performing the adding tasks, students could not use a calculator, but they were provided with scratch paper. Before taking part in the first round, students had a practice round in which they performed the adding task for two-minutes (performance in this round did not affect earnings). Importantly, although students are informed of their own performance after each addition task, they do not receive any information about the performance or choices of others before the fifth round. The first four rounds of experiment correspond to:

1. *Tournament*: In this round, students are compensated for performing the addition task in following way: the student with the highest number of correct answers in a group earns \$2.00 per correct answer while the remaining three students earn \$0.00 (ties are broken randomly).

2. *Choice*: In this round, prior to performing the addition task, students *choose* whether they are compensated according to a piece rate, whereby they earn \$0.50 per correct answer, or according to a tournament, whereby they earn \$2.00 per correct answer if they answer correctly more sums in this round than each of the other group members did in the previous round and \$0.00 otherwise (again, ties are broken randomly). Note that this design ensures that the students' earnings in this round do not depend on the (expected)

choices of others.

3. *Piece-rate*: In this round, students are compensated for performing the addition task according to a piece rate of \$0.50 per correct answer.

4. *Beliefs about Tournament*: In this round, students do not perform the addition task. Instead, they are asked to estimate their performance in the first round relative to the performance of others in their group. Specifically, students are reminded of the number of sums they answered correctly in round 1 and are then asked “*For each of the ranks below, what is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you think you got that rank in Task 1?*” Responses across all ranks needed to add up to 100. A quadratic scoring rule is used to incentivize the true reporting of beliefs, with a maximum compensation of \$20.00 if the subjective rank distribution matches the students’ actual rank.

The four remaining rounds are not analyzed in this paper. In the first of those rounds, students decided whether they want to be paid for their performance in the piece-rate round (i.e., their performance in round iii) according to a tournament or a piece-rate compensation scheme. In the remaining three rounds, students received information concerning their actual performance relative to one randomly chosen group member in the piece-rate task to elicit their updated beliefs about their rank and re-elicited their choice in the fifth round.

After all eight rounds were completed, we elicited the students’ *risk preferences*. To do so, we gave students an incentivized task similar to that in Dohmen et al. (2010). The risk preferences elicitation entails ten choices, one of which is randomly chosen for payment. Each choice consists of selecting between a lottery and a certain payoff. The lottery is the same in all choices (winning either \$5 or \$1, each with a 0.50 probability), but the certain payoff increases from \$1.25 in the first choice to \$3.50 in the tenth choice in increments of \$0.25. If students are expected utility maximizers, they should prefer the lottery up to a specific certain payoff and then switch to the certain payoff in all subsequent choices. For example, a risk neutral individual chooses the lottery over the certain payoff when it is between \$1.25 and \$2.75, is indifferent when it equals \$3.00, and prefers the certain payoff when it equals \$3.25 or

more.

Thereafter, students were asked to complete a survey (constructed using SurveyMonkey). The survey took 30 minutes to complete. After the survey, we randomly selected a round to be paid and paid them their earnings in private.

B.2 Experimental Instructions

Below we provide the instructions for the first four rounds of the experiment. The instructions of the remaining rounds are available upon request.

Welcome

In the experiment today you will be asked to complete eight different tasks. None of these will take more than 4 minutes. At the end of the experiment you will receive \$5 for having completed the eight tasks. In addition we will randomly select one of the tasks and pay you based on your performance in that task. Once you have completed the eight tasks, we will determine which task counts for payment by drawing a number between 1 and 8. The method we use to determine your earnings varies across tasks. Before each task we will describe in detail how your payment is determined.

Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment for the randomly selected task, and your \$5-payment for completing the tasks.

Please do not talk with one another at any point during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.

Practice Round

In the experiment today, some tasks consist of calculating the sum of four randomly chosen two-digit numbers. Throughout the experiment, you cannot use a calculator, however you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper. You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.

To familiarize you with the screen, you will take part in a practice round. The practice round will NOT affect your payment. Once everyone has finished reading, you will be given 2 minutes to calculate sums.

Task 1 – Tournament

For Task 1 you will be given 4 minutes to calculate the sum of four randomly chosen two-digit numbers. Your payment for Task 1 will depend on your performance relative to that of a group of other participants. Specifically, you have been randomly paired with three other participants currently in the room to form a group of *four people*. If Task 1 is the task randomly selected for payment, then your earnings will depend on the number of sums you solve compared to the three other people in your group. The individual who correctly solves the largest number of sums will receive \$2 per correct sum, while the other participants will receive \$0. If there are ties the winner will be randomly determined. We refer to this as the *tournament* payment. You will not be informed of your relative performance in Task 1 until all tasks have been completed. Are there any questions before we begin?

Task 2 - Choice

As in the previous task you will be given 4 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of four 2-digit numbers. However, you will get to choose the payment scheme that will apply to your performance in this task.

If Task 2 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this task are determined as follows:

- If you choose *piece rate*, you will receive \$0.50 per sum you solve correctly (your payment is unaffected by incorrectly answered sums). Note that in this case your payment does not depend on the performance of other participants.
- If you choose *tournament*, your performance will be evaluated relative to the *performance in Task 1* of the other participants in your group. If you correctly solve more sums than they did in Task 1, then you will receive \$2 for every sum you solve correctly in Task 2. However, if you do not solve more sums in Task 2 than the others in your group did in Task 1 then you will receive \$0 in this task. If there are ties the winner will be randomly determined.

You will not be informed of your relative performance in Task 2 until all

tasks have been completed. Are there any questions before we begin?

Task 3 – Piece Rate

As in the previous two tasks, you will be given 4 minutes to calculate the sum of four randomly chosen two-digit numbers.

If Task 3 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you will receive \$0.50 per sum you solve correctly (your payment is unaffected by incorrectly answered sums). Note that your payment in Task 3 does not depend on the performance of other participants. We refer to this payment as the *piece rate* payment. Are there any questions before we begin?

Task 4 – Belief about Task 1

We next ask you about how you believe your performance in Task 1 compared to the performance of the other three participants of your group in the Task 1. You obtained one of four ranks within your group, with 1 being the highest rank (i.e., if your Task 1 performance was better than the Task 1 performance of all the other three group members) and 4 being the lowest rank.

Recall that in Task 1, you correctly solved X sum(s).

For each of the ranks below, what is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you think you got that rank in Task 1? Enter a number between 0 and 100 for each rank (do not enter a percent sign). The numbers across all ranks need to add up to 100.

1	highest	—
2		—
3		—
4	lowest	—
	Total	100

If Task 4 is the one randomly chosen for payment, you will be paid depending on the accuracy of your beliefs according to the following formula: $20 - 10 \sum_{k=1}^4 (1\{\text{rank} = k\} - 0.01 \times p_k)^2$. While this formula may look complicated, what it means for you is simple: *you get paid the most on average when you honestly report your best guesses of the probability of each rank.* The range of payoff is \$0-\$20.

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