

Occupational Pensions and Interfirm Job Mobility in The European Union. Evidence from The ECHP Survey

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Abstract

Discussion of problems posed by defined benefit occupational pension plans to the free circulation of private sector workers in the European Union has been mainly driven by theoretical arguments, while little attempt has been made to support these arguments with empirical evidence. The paper's main objective is to fill this gap, modelling the role of expected pension portability losses on individual job mobility choices in a sample of European Union Member States with different pension portability rules, and estimating the model with a new longitudinal data set derived from the first two waves of the European Community Household Panel survey. Individual job mobility status is seen as endogenously determined through a comparative evaluation of expected benefits and costs from mobility. Following Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure, we consistently estimate wage equations parameters and individual mover/stayer structural wage differentials corrected for self selectivity. Maximum likelihood estimation of a structural probit equation accounting for estimated wage differentials allows the recovering of structural mobility costs parameters. In particular, occupational defined benefit pensions seem to act, through pension portability losses, as a significant impediment to individual labour mobility in all countries but Spain, while evidence for Denmark is consistent with full portability of defined contribution pensions.

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Non Technical Summary

This paper provides a comparative empirical analysis of occupational pension rights' portability in a sample of European Union Member States, grounded on a structural econometric model of interfirm job mobility. Our modelling approach constitutes an enrichment to the previous literature on pension portability, which does not take into account the potential self selectivity problem embedded in individual job mobility choices, while extending the empirical applications of the standard Roy's two-sectors self-selection model to estimation of the structural determinants of interfirm job mobility. In particular, we model the individual job change decision as depending on expected benefits and costs from mobility, including pension portability losses expected by early leavers from defined benefit plans, whose comparative evaluation brings individuals to self-select as movers or stayers. This is expressed through a binary selection index representing observed choices. The index is inferred to be positive if the individual has changed job, assuming value one, and negative otherwise. The econometric model is completed by observed movers' and stayers' lifetime wage equations.

Determination of net returns from mobility requires knowledge of individual expected present value of lifetime wages related to the actual choice taken as well as that related to the choice not taken. Given unobservability of alternative wage profiles, we could estimate the unconditional wage differential for each observationally identical individual using available data, under the hypothesis that individuals are randomly assigned to their mover/stayer status. However, this procedure is likely to generate selectivity bias in the estimates, as far as sample selection is not randomly made and individuals choosing to move or to stay are those who gain more than average in doing so.

Following Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure we obtain consistent estimates of sample-selection corrected structural wage equations for movers and stayers, as well as a measure of the individual wage differential. Maximum likelihood estimation of a structural probit equation for the probability of interfirm job mobility allows us to identify the structural mobility costs equation and wage differential parameters. The model tests also for the existence of wage premia accruing to pension covered workers through a pension coverage dummy variable included in wage equations.

Empirical results show that in each country pension portability rules play an important role in individual job mobility choices. In particular, the pension wealth loss expected by members of defined benefit plans while moving to a different employer reduces significantly the probability of individual job mobility in all countries but Spain, while results for Denmark are consistent with our expectation that defined contribution plan coverage does not significantly affect individual job mobility decisions, given that they guarantee full portability of accrued pension rights. This confirms earlier results for the United Kingdom, while providing completely new evidence for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain. It is however important to highlight that the role of defined benefit pensions in the labor market is much more relevant in those countries, like the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, where pension plans cover large sections of private sector labor force. Portability of the pension rights within these countries has been much improved over the last two decades. Our empirical findings show however that defined benefit occupational pensions in these countries are still far from being fully portable.

1 Introduction

European Union (EU) legislation on portability of supplementary pension rights accrued by private sector migrant workers is at an early stage. The approach followed by the recent directive on the subject is to preserve these rights at least at the level guaranteed in case of within borders mobility. Country specific pension regulation is therefore crucial for both within and cross borders portability of supplementary pension rights.

National pension portability policies should take into account efficiency and equity issues raised by a limited portability of occupational pensions in relation to country specific labor market structures and pension coverage outcomes. Moreover, legislative action aiming to improve pension portability within national borders should be supported by empirical analysis aiming to define the role played by employer provided pensions on individual mobility decisions. Such evidence is however lacking in most of the EU countries and the main objective of the paper is to fill this gap. Our modelling approach innovates on previous US empirical studies on pension portability, accounting for potential self selection bias embedded in individual mobility choices, while at the same time extending empirical applications of the standard two-sectors Roy's self-selection model to estimation of the structural determinants of interfirm job mobility.

We model the individual job change decision as depending on expected benefits and costs from mobility, including pension portability losses expected by early leavers from defined benefit plans, whose comparative evaluation brings individuals to self-select as movers or stayers. This is expressed through a binary selection index representing observed choices. The index is inferred to be positive if the individual has changed job, assuming value one, and negative otherwise. The econometric model is completed by observed movers' and stayers' lifetime wage equations.

Determination of net returns from mobility requires knowledge of individual expected present value of lifetime wages related to the actual choice taken as well as that related to the choice not taken. Given unobservability of alternative wage profiles, we could estimate the unconditional wage differential for each observationally identical individual using available data, under the hypothesis that individuals are randomly assigned to their mover/stayer status. However, this procedure is likely to generate selectivity bias in the estimates, as far as sample selection is not randomly made and individuals choosing to move or to stay are those who gain more than average in doing so.

Following Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure we obtain consistent estimates of sample-

typically short vesting period², receiving an actuarially fair lump-sum distribution equal to his accumulated pension wealth.

In defined benefit plans the sponsoring employer promises to the worker the payment of a pension annuity of the following form:

$$P_R = b(R - t_{k_i-1})W(R); \quad (1)$$

where:

P_R = pension annuity accrued at normal retirement age R ;

t_{k_i-1} = age of entry into the pension plan;

$R - t_{k_i-1}$ = years of pensionable service accumulated at retirement;

b = annual accrual rate;

$W(R)$ = final wage at retirement.

Assuming vesting after V years of service, if the worker separates after $t - t_{k_i-1} < V$ years of service, he forfeits pension rights amounting to:

$$P_{VestingLoss} = b(t - t_{k_i-1})W(t); \quad (2)$$

In the case where separation occurs after the vesting period but before retirement, $V < t - t_{k_i-1} < R$, the worker will be entitled to receive, upon retirement, a pension annuity calculated as:

$$P_t = b(t - t_{k_i-1})W(t); \quad (3)$$

Even if the worker joined a new job with the same wage, the same wage growth path and the same pension plan, and if he stayed in the new job until retirement, the total pension annuity received from the two pension plans would be smaller than the one he would have received upon remaining with the first employer until retirement. The fact that typically $W(t) < W(R)$ implies that the pension annuity calculated by the former plan would weight the former years of pensionable service with a lower final wage. Equations (4) to (6) below show the source of the Pension Annuity Loss:

$$b(R - t_{k_i-1})W(R) > b(t - t_{k_i-1})W(t) + b(R - t)W(R); \quad (4)$$

$$b(t - t_{k_i-1})W(R) > b(t - t_{k_i-1})W(t); \quad (5)$$

$$P_{AnnuityLoss} = b(t - t_{k_i-1})[W(R) - W(t)] > 0; \quad (6)$$

²Defined as the minimum length of service to be completed in order to obtain pension rights' entitlement.

However, this is only half of the story. The key point here is to know how much a worker is paying for his defined benefit pension in terms of foregone cash wage, that is to know the amount of the annual pension compensation. This latter is strictly dependent on the nature of the defined benefit pension contract, which has been analyzed within two opposite frameworks.

Under the spot contract theory view, proposed by Bulow (1982), defined benefit pensions are seen as short term contracts, where the parties involved can terminate the contract anytime. Workers are required to forego wages corresponding to the pension rights to which they would be entitled upon termination of the contract while firms are liable to pay contributions corresponding to the "legally accrued" pension liabilities. In this framework, the annual pension compensation and the separation pension annuity are calculated on the current wage, implying that the worker does not suffer any portability loss upon separation.

Alternatively, in the implicit contract theory view, proposed by Ippolito (1985), the pension contract is considered as a long term agreement between the worker and his employer where the worker is required to forego wages equal to the value of pension rights to which he would be entitled upon retirement, conditionally on not leaving the firm. At the same time, the employer commits to not terminating the worker (and the plan) through reputational arguments³. Annual pension compensation represents here a constant portion of retirement wage. Upon separation the worker receives from the firm only the "legally accrued rights"; the worker's pension loss is thus proportional to the difference between the retirement wage and the separation wage, as shown in (6).

These different views of the pension contract lead to different position in the controversial debate on the effects of pension portability on labor market efficiency⁴. If the labor market is seen as a spot market, quits and layoffs can be considered as instruments permitting the absorption of any shock to demand or technology, through reallocation of workers to their highest productive job match. The spot contract view follows the theory of equalizing differences in requiring the observed wage differential to equalize the total monetary and nonmonetary advantages or disadvantages among different jobs, and therefore also the composition of pay packages, included pensions and other fringe benefits as substitutes for direct cash wage payments. Pension contracts can thus be considered as short term

³Although firms have an incentive to fire workers and collect a capital gain on their pensions, concern about labor market reputation and the ability to write similar productivity-enhancing contracts in the future can prevent this from happening.

⁴See Dorsey (1995).

contracts and their portability is a condition for labor market efficiency.

Alternatively, in the contract theory view the matching of workers to jobs in the labor market depends on the availability of match-specific rents or quasi-rents. Productivity gains deriving from long job tenures are emphasized and defined benefit pensions are seen as an instrument to increase labour market efficiency through preserving productive job matches, stimulating firm specific human capital (training) investments on workers, or creating incentives for workers not to shirk. The pension contract is considered here as a long term agreement between the worker and his employer where the non-portability of pensions is a condition for labor market efficiency.

Empirical evidence generally supports the implicit contract view. First, direct evaluation of the impact of defined benefit pension accruals on cash wage profiles over tenure levels suggest that workers pay for a "stay pension"⁵. Second, empirical studies provide evidence of a significant negative relationship between pensions and job mobility, supporting indirectly the implicit contract view. Earlier studies focus either on the impact of a pension coverage dummy variable on the probability of job mobility expressed through probit/logit reduced form equations⁶, or on the impact of vesting provisions on tenure expressed through hazard rate models⁷.

More recent literature⁸, starting from the established empirical finding that individuals with pension coverage have lower turnover, aims to explain through more elaborate models the primary causes of this behaviour. Under an implicit contract framework, standard motivations for the predicted impact of pensions on mobility are portability losses, imposed by defined benefit plans to workers switching job before retirement, and compensation premia accruing to pension covered workers and acting as efficiency wages in preventing shirking, in economizing on hiring and training costs, and in optimally matching workers to jobs. Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1993) introduce self-selection as a further explanation of observed lower mobility rates among pension covered workers. Defined benefit pension formulas based on final salary include a "bonding"⁹ component that imposes sizeable pension wealth losses to workers who leave the firm before the end of the implicit pension contract.

⁵See Ippolito (1985) and Kotlikoff and Wise (1985).

⁶Mitchell (1983).

⁷Wolf and Levy (1984).

⁸Allen, Clark and McDermed (1988, 1993), Gustman and Steinmeier (1993).

⁹Enforcement of implicit long term employment contracts usually requires workers to "post a bond", accepting steep age-earnings profiles and deferred compensation. This latter mechanism, imposing exit costs to workers who leave the firm, discourages quits and layoffs for shirking. In this framework pensions are seen as an efficient way to defer wages while substituting for mandatory retirement (Lazear, 1979).

Pension portability losses are thus thought to act as a self-selection device inducing "stable" workers to join pension covered jobs while screening out workers who are likely to quit or to be laid off¹⁰. The causation here runs in the opposite direction to the financial disincentive mechanism. The decision to join a pension covered job is seen as endogenous and it is the "intrinsic stability" of pension covered workers that determines their lower turnover rates; the self selection mechanism thus allows to capture unobservable heterogeneity related to the workers' quit propensity. The mobility decision is also seen as endogenous, but driven by different determinants for workers covered by an occupational pension plan and those without pension coverage. Estimation, based on US Panel Survey on Income Dynamics (PSID) data, of a switching bivariate probit model of pension coverage and turnover leads the authors to conclude that the main reason why lower turnover is observed among workers covered by pensions is the prospect of capital losses of pension wealth, while there is no change in turnover at the point of vesting and compensation premia accruing to pension covered workers significantly reduce labor mobility. The expected capital loss has however little effect on the unconditional sorting of workers by pension coverage, even if there is evidence that "stable" workers self-select into pension covered jobs on the basis of their observable characteristics.

A different research approach is followed by Gustman and Steinmeier (1993). They question the causal interpretation usually attributed to the strong negative correlation between pension coverage and measures of job mobility or tenure. Rather, they look for other causal factors whose omission could have generated this correlation, suggesting in particular that causality may run from the implicit contract, interpreted as the omitted factor, to mobility and pension design. As implicit contracts may provide the payment of compensation premia to pension covered workers, the authors estimate the relative role of lifetime efficiency wage premia versus pension backloading on job mobility. Using the US Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, they model the individual job change decision between two waves of the panel as depending on current as well as on alternative job lifetime wage earnings, on a constructed pension backloading variable and

¹⁰Ippolito (1997) proposes an extension of this theoretical argument. Assuming that workers can be classified as "low" or "high" discounters and that low discounters have some characteristics that is ex-ante unobservable but valuable to the firm (such as higher productivity or lower turnover rates), he argues that defined contribution plans, as well as defined benefit plans, are natural candidates for sorting workers on the basis of their unobserved discount rate. In particular backloaded structure of defined benefit plans attracts low discounters, while actuarially fair lump sums provided to early leavers by defined contribution plans encourage the departure of mistakenly hired high discounters early in tenure.

been driven either by consideration of the relative development of occupational pension plans in a particular country or by data availability. We have excluded from analysis countries characterized by compulsory supplementary protection (France, Greece) or by very low occupational pension coverage rates (Italy, Portugal). In the same way Germany has been excluded from the sample only because of unavailability of data on pension coverage for both years, while Luxembourg has been excluded because of the limited size of its sample. For each country a longitudinal dataset linking wave 1 (1994) to wave 2 (1995) has been used. We have then selected a sample of individuals aged between 20 and 64 at the beginning of the sample period, working as employees for at least 30 hours per week in non-agricultural private industries/occupations in both waves.

ECHP provides a number of individual, firm and job specific characteristics, suitable for use in econometric analysis. After selecting the variables specified in the econometric model and deletion of observations with missing values, we have been left with: 1.178 observations for Denmark, 1.117 for Ireland, 1.426 for Netherlands, 2.091 for Spain and 1.404 for United Kingdom.

For the purposes of our analysis it is crucial to know if the worker was covered by an occupational plan at the time when the job mobility decision was taken, and, if it is the case, to obtain a description of pension plan design and characteristics. As to the first point, table 1 provides figures for private sector occupational pensions coverage rate¹³, comparing ECHP data with data provided by the European Commission's (EC) Green Paper on Supplementary Pensions¹⁴. An important limitation to comparability of ECHP data within countries arises from some wording variations in the standard pension coverage questions between wave 1 and 2¹⁵ and from the implementation of these changes in country specific questionnaires. It seems that such modifications have completely changed the nature of pension coverage questions in Spain, introducing measurement error, while providing at the same time, for countries such as Netherlands, UK, and Denmark, a closer fit of the ECHP pension coverage rate to the EC one. Only Irish pension coverage data

¹³Defined as the ratio of pension covered full time private sector employees to the number of private sector employees, where pension coverage refers to active membership of an occupational pension plan.

¹⁴Commission of the European Communities (1997).

¹⁵In wave 1 the respondent was asked:

-Does your employer provide a supplementary pension scheme to any employees?

If yes: -Are you personally in that scheme?

In wave 2 the questions were changed to:

- Are you a member of a job-related or occupational pension scheme?

are fully consistent in both years with those provided by EC. For purposes of analysis we have therefore assumed that for Ireland and Spain, all workers covered by an occupational pension in 1994 preserve their coverage status in 1995, independently of their mobility choices, while for Netherlands, Denmark and United Kingdom all workers covered by an occupational pension in 1995 were also covered in 1994, also independently of their mobility status.

ECHP data do not provide any information about pension plan typology and rules. Relying on data reported by country specific occupational pensions surveys, we assume that workers are covered by defined benefit plans in all countries but Denmark, where defined contribution plans are dominant¹⁶. A further important limitation of the data is the left truncation of the job tenure variable for people that started their job before 1980. This causes an underestimation of expected pension portability losses.

The other key factor for an empirical analysis of the pension-mobility relationship is individual job mobility. In our data set the respondent is considered to be a mover if he changed employer between the first and the second interview¹⁷.

Interpretation of job mobility as the outcome of individuals' maximizing behaviour suggests that we should only consider voluntary labor mobility. ECHP allows us to distinguish between individual initiated separations (quits) or firm initiated separations (layoffs). However, the limited proportion of movers' in the samples, the high proportion of missing values in the quit/layoff variables for the United Kingdom, together with some theoretical argument, illustrated in section 6, have suggested that we consider the event of a job change, irrespective of who initiates it, as the unit of analysis.

Now that we have described the fundamental elements needed for pension portability analysis, it is worthwhile to remark that such analysis could be undertaken at two different levels.

Within-borders pension portability refers to the preservation of pension rights accrued by workers moving within national borders, being strictly tied to country specific regulations and pension plan design choices.

Cross-borders pension portability refers to the safeguard of pension rights accrued by

¹⁶Detailed information on pension plans was however not available for Spain. In this case the assumption that all plans are of the defined benefit type relies on general informations reported in the relevant literature and has then to be taken cautiously.

¹⁷The "time window" for job change analysis is therefore varying between individuals. Change of employer is determined through informations reported on dates at which the worker stopped work with his previous employer and started with a new one between the first and second interview.

workers moving to a different country. In this case differences in country specific pension regulations, including fiscal and plan design aspects, enter into the picture putting additional constraints on labor mobility.

The use of ECHP data for purposes of analysis of cross-borders mobility between EU member States is prevented by inadequate follow-up rules, by endogenous attrition bias problems and by the limited sample sizes. The main aim of the paper is then to use these data for a comparative analysis of the role that occupational pensions play in individuals' "within borders" job mobility choices in a sample of EU countries characterized by different pension regulatory frameworks. The next section provides preliminary empirical evidence on the pensions-mobility relationship.

4 Some Evidence on Pensions, Wages and Job Mobility

Figures reported in table 1 represent the first element to consider while assessing the role of second tier pension provision within a national pension system. In particular, they give rough indications on the pattern of occupational pension coverage exhibited by each country, as a result of historical, political, economic and social factors. From this perspective we can divide the countries analyzed in three groups.

The first is composed by Denmark and the Netherlands, the countries with highest private sector pension coverage rates, figured as around 80%. In these countries, occupational pension plans have been established mainly at industry wide level through employers' federations and trade unions. The high degree of union coverage and the mandatory nature of participation in industry-wide funds have guaranteed pension coverage of large sections of the workforce.

Ireland and the United Kingdom belong to a second group of countries that seem to have followed a different pattern of second tier development, with a coverage rate of private sector employees ranging between 40% and 50%. This lower coverage rate can be explained by the fact that, even if occupational pension plans have a long tradition in these countries playing a major role in integrating basic social security pension benefits, the choice of plan membership has been left to the individual.

A last, different pattern of coverage has been followed by Spain, where occupational pension coverage of private sector workers is estimated between 9 and 15%. Most covered

The Netherlands Early leavers' deferred benefits are usually voluntarily indexed by sponsoring employers, while post retirement indexation of preserved benefits becomes compulsory only when the scheme provides indexation for pensions in payment. The 1987 Pensions and Savings Fund Act introduced the obligation for pension schemes to entitle early leavers with a deferred benefit proportional to the length of plan membership. Moreover, occupational pension members changing job after July 1994 have been given the statutory right of transferring their accrued rights to another pension scheme. Portability of pension rights differs between industry wide plans and company pension plans. Industry wide plans usually guarantee portability of pensionable service within a particular industry, enabling workers to change jobs without losing service credit when they resume work with another employer in the plan. Company pension plans transfer deferred benefits through five portability clearing-houses called transfer circuits, in which a plan can participate upon satisfying a number of requisites. A job leaver has the option of keeping the vested rights in the former employer's plan or to use a clearing-house for transferring them to the new employer's plan. Again, these transfer circuits operate between company plans within a particular industry, so that people moving jobs within industries are not penalized.

Spain Employees leaving a company pension plan have their accrued rights preserved under the scheme they are leaving, but without any revaluation over time. Members of Qualified Plans have the option, while leaving their job, to transfer their position to a new scheme, conditional on its qualification.

The United Kingdom Early leavers with vested benefits can have their accrued rights preserved in the pension scheme. The 1993 Pension Schemes Act requires deferred benefits to be revalued until retirement guaranteeing a minimum limited price indexation up to 5% inflation. Alternatively they can take a transfer value to a new occupational pension scheme or to a personal pension or purchase an annuity.

6 The Model

The literature on pensions and mobility does not share a common view on the role played by financial disincentives, compensation premia and self-selection arguments in explaining the lower mobility rates of pension covered workers. Empirical evidence is far from conclusive and further research is needed, together with adequate data. However, it seems to be

evident that mobility is affected not only by the worker's current wage and potential capital loss, but also by how his current compensation compares to that on alternative jobs. Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) follow this approach, but they do not explicitly take into account the sample selection problem arising when the mobility decision is endogenous.

The model presented in this section²¹ focuses on the role played by structural wage differentials and expected portability losses in the job mobility decision, while testing for the existence of compensation premia accruing to pension covered workers. We don't consider the self-selection of workers into pension/no pension jobs but we account for potential selectivity bias arising when the individual mobility choice is made endogenous due to potential correlation between the unobservables determining the choice and alternative prospective wages.

The model is based on a binary representation of the job mobility decision. Individuals in the sample are assumed to observe the lifetime earnings wage profile in their current job as well as in their next best alternative. They also perceive a variety of pecuniary and non-pecuniary mobility costs either due to the loss of accumulated firm specific human capital or to family and location costs; in addition, workers covered by defined benefit plans expect to suffer a pension wealth loss while moving to a new job, due to limited portability of their accrued pension rights.

Interfirm job mobility in this framework represents basically a response to perceived net gains: a worker is expected to move if the discounted returns to a new job exceed the sum of the discounted returns to the current job and the discounted costs of moving. For this reason, one should interpret quits as the appropriate dependent variable. There are several reasons, however, to consider the effect of pension coverage on all job changes. Besides the limited sample size problems mentioned in section 3, a theoretical argument is provided by Borjas and Rosen (1980) and McLaughlin (1991). They argue that in an efficient turnover framework a truly meaningful distinction cannot be made between quits and layoffs since workers wishing to quit could induce a layoff, while firms desiring a layoff could induce a quit. The choice of "job change" as the unit of analysis is also consistent with the implicit

²¹This model was pioneered by Roy (1951) and since then has been applied to the analysis of a wide variety of individual economic choices, ranging from choice of education level (Willis and Rosen 1979), geographical mobility/migration (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1980, Robinson and Tomes 1982), occupational choice (Rees and Shah 1986) and interfirm job mobility (Borjas and Rosen 1980; Simpson 1990; Kidd 1991). The focus of these studies is mostly on the consequences of the choice taken, that is on estimation of returns from mobility and average wage differentials, while we are rather looking for the causes of job mobility.

contract view of pensions, which predicts, on the basis of reputational arguments, lower layoff rates for pension covered workers. On the grounds of these arguments we therefore assume all turnover to be "efficient" irrespective of who initiates it.

The mobility choice of individual i depends on the following simple rule:

$$I_i^m \sim Y_{mi} - Y_{si} - C_i \geq 0; \quad (7)$$

where:

Y_{mi} is the expected present value of lifetime earnings on the assumption that the individual moves into his best alternative job;

Y_{si} is the expected present value of lifetime earnings on the assumption that the individual remains in his current job;

C_i is the expected present value of costs associated with mobility.

The individual mobility choice in (7) is thus based on an ex-ante comparison. The individual moves to a different job if his expected lifetime earnings gains exceed mobility costs $Y_{mi} - Y_{si} > C_i$. Otherwise he stays in his current job.

In representing the individual decision empirically we have two main problems. First, we don't observe lifetime wage earnings for actual movers and stayers but only current earnings. However, current earnings can be considered as a proxy of lifetime earnings²².

The second, and even more important, problem is that we cannot observe the current wages conditional on individual mobility status; we can only observe the current wage conditional on the choice actually taken. We have then to use the estimated coefficients

²²Franco Peracchi made me aware that under this approach individual expected lifetime wage earnings are supposed to follow a random walk process, with current earnings as the best predictor for future earnings.

Another approach would have been to assume a constant, but unobserved, rate of future wage growth, discounting back at a constant interest rate the streams of future wages and assuming that the individual stays in his job until retirement, on the basis of the following formula:

$$\text{LifetimeWage} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Y_t e^{(g^e - i^e)t};$$

where:

g^e = expected nominal rate of wage growth

i^e = expected nominal discount rate

However, as suggested by Simpson (1990), these approaches are similar in that both implicitly assume that available information about current wages is indicative of lifetime wages.

industry, occupation, supervisory status, employer size and occupational pension coverage, as follows:

$$\ln Y_{mi} = \beta_m^0 X_i + v_{mi} \quad (12)$$

$$\ln Y_{si} = \beta_s^0 X_i + v_{si} \quad (13)$$

where:

$\ln Y_{mi}$ is the natural logarithm of hourly net 1995 wage for movers;

$\ln Y_{si}$ is the natural logarithm of hourly net 1995 wage for stayers;

X_i is a vector of personal and 1995 job specific variables;

$\beta_m^0; \beta_s^0$ are vectors of unknown parameters;

$v_{mi}; v_{si}$ are continuous random errors containing unobservable variables, such as individual abilities and specific capital that are useful in the chosen job, distributed independently of X_i with zero mean and unknown variances $\sigma_m^2; \sigma_s^2$.

Equations (11); (12); and (13) represent the structural model of interfirm job mobility. Substituting from (12) and (13) into (11) yields the reduced form selection index:

$$I_i^* = \beta_m^0 X_i + \beta_s^0 X_{ci} + (v_{mi} - v_{si}) + v_{ci} \quad (14)$$

$$= \beta^0 W_i + v_i$$

where:

$$W_i = [X_i; X_{ci}];$$

$$\beta^0 = [\beta_m^0; \beta_s^0; \beta_c^0];$$

$$v_i = (v_{mi} - v_{si}) + v_{ci};$$

Since the parameters of the reduced form probit equation are estimable only up to a scale factor, we can assume, without any loss of generality, that v_i has a unit variance.

The decision rule (14) selects individuals into movers and stayers according to their largest expected present value. Therefore, wages actually observed in each group are not random samples of the population, but truncated samples.

The expected value of worker i 's wage conditional on observed characteristics and mobility status is:

$$E(\ln Y_{mi} | X_i; W_i; I_i = 1) = \beta_m^0 X_i + E(v_{mi} | X_i; W_i; I_i = 1); \quad (15)$$

$$E(\ln Y_{si} | X_i; W_i; I_i = 0) = \beta_s^0 X_i + E(v_{si} | X_i; W_i; I_i = 0); \quad (16)$$

Knowledge of the functional form of the conditional mean errors allows estimation of the model parameters. Assuming that the error terms $(v_{mi}; v_{si}; v_i)$ are independent of $(X_i; W_i)$ and have a trivariate normal distribution, with a zero mean vector and unknown variance covariance matrix:

$$\Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_m^2 & \sigma_{sm} & \sigma_{vm} \\ \sigma_{ms} & \sigma_s^2 & \sigma_{vs} \\ \sigma_{mv} & \sigma_{sv} & \sigma_v^2 \end{pmatrix};$$

equations (15) and (16) may be rewritten as:

$$E(\ln Y_{mij} | X_i; W_i; I_i = 1) = \beta_m X_i + \sigma_{mv} \lambda_{mi}(-\beta W_i); \quad (17)$$

$$E(\ln Y_{sij} | X_i; W_i; I_i = 0) = \beta_s X_i + \sigma_{sv} \lambda_{si}(-\beta W_i); \quad (18)$$

where $\lambda_{mi}(-\beta W_i) = \frac{\hat{A}(-\beta W_i)}{\hat{\Phi}(-\beta W_i)}$ and $\lambda_{si}(-\beta W_i) = \frac{\hat{A}(-\beta W_i)}{\hat{\Phi}(-\beta W_i)}$ are the Inverse Mills' ratios; $\hat{A}(\cdot)$ and $\hat{\Phi}(\cdot)$ being the standard normal density and cumulative distribution function respectively.

Selectivity bias in wage equations estimation derives from the correlation between the unobserved determinants of interfirm job mobility and the unobserved wage related characteristics, such as ambition and propensity to human capital investments. If the errors in the selection and outcome equations were uncorrelated, the regression function for the outcome on the selected subsample would be the same as the population regression function. In this case there would not be any selection bias and ordinary least square methods could be used to consistently estimate β_j on the selected subsample. In general, however, this does not occur.

The model is estimated using Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure. The first stage involves maximum likelihood estimation of the reduced-form probit equation (14) on the full sample. The second stage consistently estimates wage equations' parameters through inclusion of the estimated inverse Mills' ratio. The sign of the selectivity correction terms, $\hat{\sigma}_{mv} \lambda_{mi}$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{sv} \lambda_{si}$, depends on σ_{mv} and σ_{sv} : A positive sign of the selectivity correction term implies positive selection in the chosen category, suggesting that the observed sample mean wage of job stayers/movers for a given set of characteristics is higher than the population mean²³.

²³A negative sign of the selectivity term implies that the observed sample mean wages for individuals with a given set of characteristics and conditional on their mobility status is lower than the population mean, but this does not necessarily imply that these individuals would have done better choosing the alternative status. That is, their ex-ante individual structural wage differential could still be positive.

Heckman's two-step estimator is however inefficient for two reasons. First, the error terms in sample selectivity corrected wage equations are heteroskedastic. A second source of inefficiency is introduced by the fact that the inverse Mills' ratios are not directly observed but rather estimated in the first step. Standard errors of estimated parameters in wage equations have then to be corrected to account for these problems²⁴. We perform this task computing Heckman's (1979) corrected variance-covariance matrix²⁵ as well as, for the purpose of comparison, using nonparametric bootstrap and jackknife methods²⁶. Wage equations' estimated coefficients are then used to predict log-wage earnings for each individual i ; given his own characteristics X_i :

$$\ln Y_{mi} = \Delta_m^0 X_i + \mathcal{M}_{mv} \hat{\lambda}_{mi} \quad (19)$$

$$\ln Y_{si} = \Delta_s^0 X_i + \mathcal{M}_{sv} \hat{\lambda}_{si} \quad (20)$$

and to compute the individual ex-ante structural wage differential:

$$\ln Y_{mi} - \ln Y_{si} = (\Delta_m^0 - \Delta_s^0) X_i + (\mathcal{M}_{mv} \hat{\lambda}_{mi} - \mathcal{M}_{sv} \hat{\lambda}_{si}) \quad (21)$$

This measure has two components: the first term is the structural mobility wage gain, representing the difference between systematic components of wages in the alternative as well as in current job, while the second term accounts for random differences not captured by wage equations but crucial in determining the job mobility decision. The structural wage differential is then substituted in (11) to obtain a structural probit function:

$$I_i^* = \Phi(\Delta_m^0 - \Delta_s^0) X_i + (\mathcal{M}_{mv} \hat{\lambda}_{mi} - \mathcal{M}_{sv} \hat{\lambda}_{si}) + \epsilon_i \quad (22)$$

where: $\epsilon_i = (\hat{v}_{mi} - \hat{v}_{si}) + v_i$:

Maximum likelihood estimation²⁷ of equation (22) allows us to obtain estimates of the structural parameters related to the principal determinants of the individual mobility choice.

The model requires identifying exclusion restrictions²⁸. First, identification of wage equations parameters requires that at least one exogenous variable belonging to the vector

²⁴There exists a substantial literature on estimating two-step estimator's variance-covariance matrix (Heckman 1979, Lee, Maddala and Trost 1980, Greene 1981, Maddala 1983).

²⁵The codes, programmed under STATA version 6, are available upon request from the author.

²⁶For a review of these methods, see Peracchi (forthcoming).

²⁷We account for the fact that the structural wage differential is only an estimate of the true one applying White's Variance-Covariance Matrix Correction.

²⁸Lee (1979).

semi-parametric estimator³². They find that most of the difference in the estimated union-nonunion wage gaps can be attributed to the constant terms, and conclude, according to previous results by Newey, Powell and Walker (1990), that their semiparametric results are close to those obtained through the conventional Heckman's two-step while being largely different from least squares estimates which do not take union status endogeneity into account. These results, notwithstanding the misspecification caveats, have provided us with a rationale for using the Heckman two-step procedure, while estimation of the model through semiparametric methods is left as an objective of our future research.

7 Empirical Results

7.1 Reduced Form Probit Estimates

Reduced form probit estimates reported in table 4 provide very limited information about the validity of the theoretical framework captured by equations (11) ; (13), giving only the total effect of each regressor on the probability of job mobility³³. Moreover, the sign of most variables included in the reduced form probit equation is a priori uncertain, thus raising interpretation problems on estimated coefficients' values.

The total effect of education in the reduced form equation can be decomposed into:

- a) the effect of education on the wage offered in the present job. General education endows individuals with general human capital which is expected to give positive returns in term of higher wages;
- b) the effect of education on alternative wage offers, expected to be positive;
- c) the effect of education on mobility costs, expected to be negative, as more educated workers are supposed to have access to better information, with a reduction of mobility costs.

These three effects can only be distinguished by estimating structural equations (11) ; (13) directly. In turn, these structural estimates can be evaluated, since the independent effects of education on wages and mobility costs are predicted a priori. The same

³²The estimator is based on Klein and Spady (1993) for the selection equation parameters, Newey (1988) for the structural equations' slope parameters, and Andrews and Schafgans (1998) for the intercept term.

³³The base case individual is male, married, without children, house owner, with upper secondary education, not covered by employer provided occupational pension, health insurance or training, not searching on the job, working as a white collar worker with no supervisory role in a medium firm in the manufacturing industry.

result suggest a significant negative selection of stayers in the latter countries. $\hat{\alpha}_m$ coefficients reported in table 6 are positive in Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain, while being negative in Ireland and in the United Kingdom. In any case the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero. These results do not conform to predictions of a theory of comparative advantages, which would sort each worker in his more productive allocation. The significance of the $\hat{\alpha}_s$ for some countries, however, allows us to emphasize the importance of accounting for sample selection bias for the purposes of our analysis.

Turning to the influence of measured variables on earnings, we notice that education level contributes to explain observed wages in the expected direction. Compared to individuals with upper secondary level education, third level educated stayers earn between 4,1% (Ireland) and 19% (United Kingdom) more, with all coefficients, but that of Ireland, significant at 95% level. On the other hand, stayers with lower secondary educational level earn between 2.3% (Netherlands) and 11,6% (Ireland) less than those in the reference category. Movers with higher educational qualifications earn significantly more only in Denmark (14.3%) and the United Kingdom (24%), while those with lower education earn significantly (at 90 % level) less only in Spain.

Female stayers earn significantly less than their male colleagues in all countries, while this is true for movers only in Denmark and Spain. Experience variables significantly contribute to explain movers' and stayers' wages along the expected direction in all countries, even if in Spain coefficients appear not to be significant at standard levels.

As to job and firm specific variables included in movers' and stayers' wage equation, there is evidence that:

- a) stayers with supervisory roles are generally significantly better paid in all countries while this is true for movers only in Netherlands and Spain³⁵;
- b) stayers and movers working as managers and professionals have significantly higher wages than those working as white collar employees in all countries. The reverse is generally true for blue collar workers, even if for movers this is less evident;
- c) stayers and movers working in small firms earn significantly less than those working with medium firms in all countries but Denmark. Stayers working in larger firms earn generally more, the coefficients being significant for Spain and the United Kingdom, while the evidence for movers is mixed;
- d) coefficients attached to industry variables present different sign and significance

³⁵Note that the dummy variable indicating job supervisory status has been omitted for United Kingdom, because of his high proportion of missing values.

negatively the chances of moving job, albeit significantly so only in Netherlands.

A prediction found in the literature on migration choices is that renting a house generally makes individuals more likely to move, as job change often implies a change of residence. It could however be true that causation runs in the opposite sense, with residential or geographical mobility driving job change decisions. Our results show that residential moves have a positive effect on the probability of job mobility, even if only for Denmark this effect is significant at 95% level. In the same way, Denmark is the only country where tenants are significantly more likely to change jobs.

Education endows a worker with skills, increasing his ability to adjust to change and to gather information on alternative job opportunities, contributing to reduce mobility costs and thus increasing job mobility. This prediction is not confirmed by our findings which indicate that education lowers the probability of job mobility. However, these findings are significant at standard levels only for Spain³⁷.

Since there are fixed costs associated with moving which must be amortized over the remainder of a worker's career, the likelihood of a job move should fall with worker's age. The model estimates generally accord to this pattern, being significant at standard level in Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom. As expected, individuals investing resources in looking for another job while employed are everywhere significantly more likely to change their job, at a particular high rate in Denmark (17.8%), Ireland (14.66%), the Netherlands (12.46%) and Spain (9.65%).

"On the job training" can be considered as a mobility cost in that it represents worker's firm specific human capital; the coefficient value of this variable has the expected negative sign in all countries, being significant at 95% level in Spain and at 90% level in Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the same way, individuals covered by employer-provided health insurance are generally less likely to change job, but only in Spain and Denmark does this finding prove to be significant at standard levels.

A positive sign of the predicted wage differential would be interpreted in the sense that the more the predicted mover earnings exceed the predicted stayer earnings for an individual, the more likely he is to move to a different job. This pattern is generally found in the data but it is significant only in the United Kingdom. We also find a negative and significant sign of the wage differential coefficient in the Netherlands. However, the latter result should not come as a surprise given that the definition of movers includes displaced

³⁷The result for Spain could be explained by the fact the majority of job moves are represented by self-reported layoffs.

workers.

The effect of expected pension portability losses on the probability of job mobility is generally found to be negative and significant. In Spain the coefficient is however not significant at standard levels. In this case we suspect that our assumption that all Spanish pension plans are of the defined benefit type could be not correct. An even more surprising finding is that the stronger negative effect (13%) is found in the Netherlands, where at least within-industry pension portability is guaranteed. This could be explained by evidence showing that the great majority of actual job changes involves inter-industry moves. In Denmark, where defined contribution plans are almost fully portable, the sign of occupational pension coverage dummy variable is still negative but insignificant. The comparison between sample mobility rates and predicted mobility for different group of workers, illustrated in table 8, provides further evidence of the good fit of the model.

8 Summary and Conclusions

This paper provides a comparative empirical analysis of occupational pension rights' portability in a sample of European Union Member States, grounded on a structural econometric model of interfirm job mobility. The modelling approach used constitutes an enrichment to the previous literature on pension portability, which does not take into account the self selectivity argument, while extending the empirical applications of the standard Roy's two-sectors self-selection model to estimation of the structural determinants of interfirm job mobility.

Empirical results show that in each country pension portability rules play an important role in individual job mobility choices. In particular, the pension wealth loss expected by members of defined benefit plans while moving to a different employer reduces significantly the probability of individual job mobility in all countries but Spain, while results for Denmark are consistent with our expectation that defined contribution plan coverage does not significantly affect individual job mobility decisions, given that they guarantee full portability of accrued pension rights. This confirms earlier results for the United Kingdom, while providing completely new evidence for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain.

It is however important to highlight that the role of defined benefit pensions in the labor market is much more relevant in those countries, like the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, where pension plans cover large sections of private sector labor force. Portability of the pension rights within these countries has been much improved over the

last two decades. Our empirical findings show however that defined benefit occupational pensions in these countries are still far from being fully portable.

As to desirability of portability reforms, it must be stressed that good public policy analysis should assess expected behavioral reactions of the economic actors involved. Portability policies should then be implemented on the basis of their expected effects on labor supply and demand, job quits, pension coverage, retirement income adequacy and savings. The main arguments advanced to support pension reform proposals towards greater portability are usually grounded on the effects brought by the changing structure of the labor market to traditional equity and efficiency arguments. In particular, equity arguments are supported by overwhelming evidence on upward trends of women participation to the labor force and downward trends of replacement ratios offered to workers by social security pensions. Efficiency arguments are mainly driven by evidence of a shift towards short term contracts even in sectors, like the public one, usually dominated by long term contracts as well as a shift of jobs to economic sectors characterized by lower coverage rates and relying less on defined benefit plans. Those viewing the pension contract as an implicit one contrast these arguments claiming that a greater pension portability would eliminate an important productivity enhancing instrument for employers. This could imply undesirable economic consequences, reducing firm specific investments (such as on-the-job training) together with reducing employer willingness to offer a pension plan.

The balance of positive and negative effects stemming from legislative action towards improving pension portability is however uncertain being also dependent on the priority assigned to different trade-offs by policy makers. In the European Union case an institutional argument adds to the traditional economic portability arguments: the application of workers' freedom of movement principle should guarantee full portability of pension rights. If this is considered as a priority of EU countries pension policies, then the relevance of our results is to support the theoretical arguments for improving pension portability with new evidence showing a significant role of defined benefit pensions as a mobility deterrant.

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$$E:P:Loss = P_S^{Stay} - P_S^{Quit} = [b(t_i - t_{k_i-1})A(t)W(t)(e^{g^e(R_i t)} - 1)e^{i^e(R_i t)}]: \quad (25)$$

In case of indexation of the early leaver's wage to price index or to nominal wage growth, the general formula would be:

$$E:P:Loss = [b(t_i - t_{k_i-1})A(t)W(t)(e^{g^e(R_i t)} - e^{\frac{1}{4}^n(R_i t)})e^{i^e(R_i t)}]; \quad (26)$$

where: $\frac{1}{4}^n = k\frac{1}{4}^e$ or $\frac{1}{4}^n = kg^e$ with $0 < k < 1$:

For empirical work it is convenient to express the cash equivalent loss in relative terms, as a fraction of the current annual wage $W(t)$:

$$E:P:Loss = b(t_i - t_{k_i-1})A(t)[e^{(g^e - i^e)(R_i t)} - e^{(\frac{1}{4}^n - i^e)(R_i t)}]; \quad (27)$$

If $t_i - t_{k_i-1} < V$, portability loss would correspond to the worker's stay pension:

$$E:P:Loss = P_S^{Stay} = b(t_i - t_{k_i-1})A(t)W(t)e^{(g^e - i^e)(R_i t)}; \quad (28)$$

or, in current wage terms:

$$E:P:Loss = b(t_i - t_{k_i-1})A(t)e^{(g^e - i^e)(R_i t)}; \quad (29)$$

Expected pension portability loss has a concave shape relative to pensionable service³⁹, being zero at the extremes of the curve and reaching his maximum around midstream in the tenure cycle. Its basic pattern does not depend upon the worker joining the firm at any specific age or upon specific assumptions about discount rate, wage growth, inflation, retirement age and pension plan parameters. The size of the expected pension portability loss is however sensitive to all these factors. A higher inflation rate increases both the nominal rate of interest and the nominal wage growth rate; these effects compensate in the stay pension formula, while the higher nominal discount rate works to reduce the quit pension, increasing the portability loss. Similarly, a higher rate of real wage growth or reflecting unobservability of stayers potential wage profiles as movers, is less realistic for older workers, especially for those who experience an involuntary move.

c) worker's mobility decision is a lifetime one. If the worker decides to stay, he stays until retirement. However, if a worker does not quit now, he may quit before retirement age sometimes in the future. The potential for a future quit works to reduce the pension loss from quitting now because the probability of collecting a "stay pension" by not quitting now is less than unity (Lazear and Moore 1988).

³⁹Accumulation of pensionable service increases the loss while at the same time reducing it by reducing the discounting effect.

Table 1. Occupational Pension Coverage

	Denmark	Ireland	Netherlands	Spain	UK
ECHP 1994	32.8%	39.9%	14.3%	9%	n.a.
ECHP 1995	77.8 %	42.1%	83.5%	97.37%	53.3%
EC (1997)	80%	40%	85%	15%	48%

Source: Our elaborations on ECHP data

Table 2. Job Mobility, Wages and Pension Coverage

	Denmark				Ireland			
	No Pension		Pension		No Pension		Pension	
	Stay	Move	Stayer	Mover	Stayer	Mover	Stayer	Mover
Observations	226	35	828	89	593	78	423	23
mobility (%)		13.4		8.7		11.6		5.1
Wage 1994	6.72	5.68	6.9	6.53	5.44	4.41	8.38	7.24
Wage 1995	7.27	6.94	7.26	7.18	6.02	6.08	9.05	8.75
⌘ Wage %	8.2	22.18	5.2	9.9	10.66	37.86	8	20.85

	Netherlands				Spain				UK			
	No Pension		Pension		No Pension		Pension		No Pension		Pension	
	Stay	Move	Stay	Move	Stay	Move	Stay	Move	Stay	Move	Stay	Move
Observations	184	51	1.111	80	1.715	188	187	1	590	65	733	16
mobility (%)		21.7		6.7		11		.005		9.9		2.1
Wage 1994	7.56	5.22	7.73	7.27	5.36	4.04	8.39	3.8	6.08	5.12	8.33	6.22
Wage 1995	6.36	5.71	7.87	7.46	6.08	4.46	9.18	4.36	6.13	5.32	8.33	7.13
⌘ Wage %	-15.87	9.38	1.8	2.6	13.4	10.4	9.4	14.7	.08	3.9	-	14.6

Source: Our elaborations on ECHP data

Table 3. Within Borders Pension Portability Rules

	Denmark	Ireland	Netherlands	Spain	UK
Type of Plan	DC	DB	DB	DB	DB
Vesting Rules	5; Age 30	5	1	vary	2
Early Leaver Index.	-	prices- 4%	prices - option.	no	prices-5%
Transfers	yes	yes	yes+ tr. circuits	yes-Q.Plans	yes

Table 4. Reduced Form Probit Model⁴²

	Denmark	Ireland	Netherlands	Spain	UK
	dF/dx	dF/dx	dF/dx	dF/dx	dF/dx
Female	-.031*	-.0067	-.026*	-.009	.000018
Unmarried	.0048	-.012	-.009	.007	.0006
House Tenant	.05**	.0023	.004	.013	.0012
Household Size	.01	-.0035	.0145**	.0048	.00016
Children	-.024	-.027*	-.029*	.01	-.0005
Residence Mover	.0767**	-.017	.012	.02	.0001
Third Level Education	-.0146	.0005	.0027	.008	-.00046
Lower Secondary Education	-.0077	-.001	-.0067	.05	-.00057
On the Job Search	.165**	.157**	.1218**	.002**	.0047**
Experience	.0007	-.006**	-.0004	-.002*	-.0003**
Experience Squared	-.0001	.00009	-.00007	.00001	.00**
Employer Health Insurance	-.039	-.0056	.016	-.012	.0008
Employer Provided Training	-.0157	-.025	-.0057	-.002	-.0014
Occupational Pension	-.01	.059**	-.034*	-.0988	.0036
Expected Portability Loss	-	-.07**	-.108**	.217	-.0224**
Job Supervisory Status	-.02	-.001	-.0237*	-.02**	-
Manager & Professional	.0415*	.0035	.0041	-.014	-.0003
Blue Collar Worker	.0467*	.0518**	.0052	.0188**	.0009
Employer Size: 0-19	.0216	.0143	.0034	.007	.0005
Employer Size: 100+	-.0232	-.0146	-.0437**	-.051**	-.006**
Construction	.0474*	.1**	-.0025	.0865**	.001
Trade, Hotels & Restaurants	-.0138	.006	-.024	.0165	.0007
Services	-.019	.05**	.0052	-.0027	.0011
N. Observations	1.178	1.117	1.426	2.091	1.404
Log-Likelihood	-335.54	-267.44	-350.74	-526.64	-217.18
Pseudo R2	15.35%	21.11%	19.84%	17%	29.87%
Observed P	10.52%	9.04%	9.18%	9.03%	5.77%
Predicted P(\bar{X})	7.38%	4.8%	5.38%	3.86%	0.14%

⁴²The parameter estimates represent the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the probability of job mobility, evaluated at the sample mean. Those marked with one asterisk are significant at 10% level, while those marked with two asterisks are significant at 5% level.

Table 7. Structural Form Probit Model⁴³

	Denmark	Ireland	Netherlands	Spain	UK
	dF/dx	dF/dx.	dF/dx	dF/dx	dF/dx
Wage Differential	.07	.07	-.144**	.035	.023**
Female	-.037**	-.016	-.007	-.02*	-.0038**
Unmarried	.0077	-.0178	-.008	.0127	.0014
House Tenant	.048**	.0007	.003	.0155	.0031
Household Size	.0117	-.0022	.015**	.0107**	.0002
Children	-.024	-.025	-.028*	.0117	-.0017
Residential Mover	.087**	-.0076	.0115	.026	.0029
Third Level Education	-.0165	-.0046	-.01	.0117	-.0017
Lower Secondary Educat.	.004	-.007	-.0035	.0415**	-.0035
On the Job Search	.178**	.1466**	.1246**	.0965**	.0119**
Experience	-.00022	-.0095**	-.001	-.0038**	-.0013**
Experience Squared	-.00007	.0001**	-.00008	.00003	.00002**
Employer Health Insurance	-.0485*	-.003	.0113	-.028**	.0006
Employer Provided Training	-.0245	-.029	-.006*	-.035**	-.004*
Expected Portability Loss	-	-.038**	-.13**	-.0658	-.0577**
Occupational Pension	-.0145	-	-	-	-
Log-Likelihood	-342.36	-281.51	-357.32	-567.33	-231.9
Wald chi2 (15)	97.03	102.7	121.64	126.26	93.00
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R2	13.63%	16.96%	18.33%	10.58%	25.12%
Observed P	10.52%	9.04%	9.18%	9.04%	5.77%
Predicted P(\bar{X})	7.8%	5.87%	5.67%	6.57%	0.55%

⁴³The parameter estimates represent the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the probability of job mobility, evaluated at the sample mean. Those marked with one asterisk are significant at 10% level; those marked with two asterisks are significant at 5% level. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.

