### CAN PARENTS AFFORD TO WORK? CHILDCARE COSTS AND WORK INCENTIVES IN EU AND OECD COUNTRIES

ESRC Festival of Social Science Event 'What works for work incentives?'


London, 7 November 2017

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www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages.htm



### Gross childcare costs can be very high, reducing financial gain to work for parents





### But to calculate work incentive impact, need to calculate *net* cost

- All OECD and EU countries have some policies in place to support parents with these costs
- Our research uses OECD tax-benefit model to calculate net cost of childcare and how these affect work incentives
  - 'out of pocket' cost to parents, after subsidised fees, childcare benefits & tax concessions taken into account
- All results focus on:
  - 2015 (latest year available)
  - Work incentives of women (primary carers in most countries)
  - Full-time centre-based childcare (for cross-country comparability)
  - Families with <u>two</u> children aged 2 and 3 (evidence suggests benefits from childcare participation from age 2 onwards)


### The OECD tax-benefit model (TaxBEN)

- <u>http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm</u>
- Incorporates detailed tax and benefit rules
- Tax burdens, benefit entitlements, childcare costs for different household situations. Captures interactions between policy areas
- Calculates disposable incomes (i.e. after childcare costs) with and without childcare costs (i.e. parental care) for policy-relevant household situations
  - <u>Not</u> for a representative sample of the whole population
  - Policy indicators rather than outcome indicators
- <u>Assumptions / limitations:</u>
  - Where policies vary across regions, typically one region selected
  - No supply-side constraints (i.e. places are assumed to be available to the family)
  - In countries where childcare centres are mostly publicly run, 'gross' fee is maximum any parent can be charged: cost may still be subsidised
  - Quality of provision does not show up in results but is key driver of parents' choices








Note: earnings at the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of the full-time female earnings distribution.




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












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

















# Summary: childcare costs for different family types

- Gross childcare costs high, > 30% of median wage in a quarter of EU Member States
- Net costs can be more than 20% of disposable income for low income families where support is low
  - And can be *higher* than fees charged by providers if some benefits (home-care allowances) are withdrawn when child participates in childcare
  - But much lower in countries with subsidised public pre-school systems where fees are often income related
- Support means-tested in most EU countries, including the UK
  - Targets support on most in need, but net costs still take up substantial share of income even for those with higher earnings
  - Can weaken incentives to increase earnings
- 'Reverse targeting' in some countries: higher-income families benefit more
  - Usually the result of tax provisions that are worth little or nothing to low-income households


Impact of childcare costs on work incentives






Note: Percentiles of female full time earnings distribution.

#### Work incentives: Can parents afford to work? Median EU country, and top/bottom four




Note: Percentiles of female full time earnings distribution. First earner always earns at 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of male full-time earnings distribution.

#### Proportion of earnings lost to... Lone parent, low earnings




Note: earnings at 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of female full-time earnings distribution

#### Proportion of earnings lost to... Lone parent, median earnings




Note: earnings at 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of female full-time earnings distribution

#### Proportion of earnings lost to... Second earner in couple, low earnings




Note: earnings at 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of female full-time earnings distribution. Partner works full time at 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of male full-time earnings distribution.

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
Note: earnings at 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of female full-time earnings distribution. Partner works full time at 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of male full-time earnings distribution.

### Childcare costs not the only reason for weak work incentives for lone parents...




Note: Average of 20<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of female earnings distribution

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
Note: Average of 20<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of female earnings distribution

### ...but are a key driver of work incentives for women in couples




Note: Average of couple where parents earn at the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of their gender-specific earnings distribution and where they earn at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of the gender-specific earnings distribution.

## ...but are a key driver of work incentives for women in couples



Note: Average of couple where parents earn at the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile of their gender-specific earnings distribution and where they earn at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of the gender-specific earnings distribution.

#### Seems to be important for outcomes: Higher enrolment associated with higher maternal employment rate



### Summary: impact of childcare costs on work incentives

- Childcare costs substantially reduce the financial returns to paid work for mothers
  - Especially at low levels of earnings: by half for lone mothers and one third for mothers in couples
  - But sizeable variation across countries depending on size of net childcare costs
- In a number of countries, including the UK, can make it not financially worthwhile to undertake paid work
- But not the only reason for weak work incentives among lone parents
  - Steep benefit withdrawal on entering work → weak incentives even in some countries with low childcare costs
- A key driver of weak incentives for mothers in couples though
- And childcare enrolment seems to be important for mothers' employment decisions